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ABSTRACT 
 Decades of research in cyberpsychology and human-computer interaction has 
pointed to a strong distinction between the online and offline worlds, suggesting that 
attitudes and behaviors in one domain do not necessarily generalize to the other. 
However, as humans spend increasing amounts of time in the digital world, psychological 
understandings of safety may begin to influence human perceptions of threat while 
online. This dissertation therefore examines whether perceived threat generalizes between 
domains across archival, correlational, and experimental research methods. Four studies 
offer insight into the relationship between objective indicators of physical and online 
safety on the levels of nation and state; the relationship between perceptions of these 
forms of safety on the individual level; and whether experimental manipulations of one 
form of threat influence perceptions of threat in the opposite domain. In addition, this 
work explores the impact of threat perception-related personal and situational factors, as 
well as the impact of threat type (i.e., self-protection, resource), on this hypothesized 
relationship. 
Collectively, these studies evince a positive relationship between physical and 
online safety in macro-level actuality and individual-level perception. Among 
individuals, objective indicators of community safety—as measured by zip code crime 
data—were a positive reflection of perceptions of physical safety; these perceptions, in 
turn, mapped onto perceived online safety. The generalization between perceived 
physical threat and online threat was stronger after being exposed to self-protection threat 
manipulations, possibly underscoring the more dire nature of threats to bodily safety than 
those to valuable resources. Most notably, experimental findings suggest that it is not the 
  ii 
physical that informs the digital, but rather the opposite: Online threats blur more readily 
into physical domains, possibly speaking to the concern that dangers specific to the 
digital world will bleed into the physical one. This generalization of threat may function 
as a strategy to prepare oneself for future dangers wherever they might appear; and 
indeed, perceived threat in either world positively influenced desires to act on 
recommended safety practices. Taken together, this research suggests that in the realm of 
threat perception, the boundaries between physical and digital are less rigid than may 
have been previously believed. 
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For millions of years, humans have been faced with external threats to safety. In 
recent decades, however, safety has increasingly incorporated two key environments: the 
historically physical milieu and the ever-growing reach of the digital world. The present 
paper concerns the translation of physical safety into safety while online—a dynamically 
evolving environment in which the average American adult spends 11 hours each day 
(Nielsen, 2016). The online world now presents new threats that do not appear in our 
traditional representations; predators, gunshots, and tell-tale signs of toxic substances do 
not necessarily translate into a disembodied world. However, the threats encountered in 
the digital age are not to be disregarded: In 2015 alone, a third of Americans were victims 
of healthcare data breaches (Bitglass, 2016) and on average, victims of phishing scams 
lost a median amount of $560 (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2015). Social media 
sharing of geotagged locations contribute to the ease and prevalence of cyberstalking, and 
approximately one person becomes a victim of identity fraud every two seconds (Pascual, 
2014). Collectively, although online threats do not appear to closely approximate threats 
in the physical world, they may pose as much danger to human lives. 
As our physical world becomes increasingly intertwined with the digital one, we 
might expect a generalized—or blurring—effect in which physical social cues that guide 
attitudes and behaviors in day-to-day life must extend into digital navigation and 
conversation (e.g., Bodford, in press; Bodford, Kwan, & Sobota, in press; Kwan & 
Bodford, 2015). It is possible that because the digital world has existed for a comparably 
short time, actual and perceived safety in the online world stems, in part, from the factors 
predicting safety in the physical world. 
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Overview of the Present Research 
To examine this question, we conducted four studies across archival, 
correlational, and experimental methodologies, and on the levels of nation, state, and 
individual. By adopting this multi-method, multi-level approach, we sought to establish a 
holistic understanding of the relationship between physical and online safety. 
 Studies 1 and 2. We first examine the relationship between physical and online 
safety as it exists in reality—that is, while observing objective, empirical indices of safety 
and threat in online and offline environments around the world. While holding constant 
macro-level factors that may influence online and offline safety (i.e., national- and state-
level wealth), we explore whether a relationship between physical and online safety 
exists across countries and U.S. states.  
Study 3. Second, we seek to investigate whether this relationship exists at the 
individual, and perceptual, level. We will first assess whether actual measures of physical 
safety (i.e., indicated by zip code-level census data) map onto perceptions of physical 
safety to establish whether we can assume that actual threats translate into individual-
level perceptions. We will next examine whether the relationship between self-reported 
perceptions of physical safety are positively related to perceptions of safety while online. 
Just as we hypothesize a positive correlation between actual physical and online safety in 
Studies 1 and 2, we predict a positive tie between their perceptual counterparts. As a 
secondary aim, we will examine the role that person-specific factors (i.e., individual 
difference variables relevant to threat perception) may play in this relationship.  
Study 4. Using experimental methods, we will further examine whether 
manipulations of physical threat guide or inform perceptions of online threat—and 
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whether the opposite also holds true, in which manipulations of online threat predict 
perceptions of safety in the offline world. As was the case in Study 3, we will explore the 
impact of person- and situation-specific factors on this causal relationship. 
Taken together, these questions add to our previously limited understanding of the 
nature of online safety and its relationship with the physical world. 
Physical and Online Safety 
 Safety, in its broadest sense, refers to the condition of being protected from 
danger, risk, or injury. From an early age, humans form a basic and deep-rooted 
understanding of how to remain safe in their physical environments. We typically think 
of safety as a construct stemming from physical barriers separating the self from a 
potential threat (locked doors, walls, fences), from knowledge of threat in the immediate 
environment, or from our own ability to defend ourselves (physical size, self-defense 
expertise). 
When we translate our physical understanding of safety into the online world, we 
commonly use the term security, which entails protection against deliberate and planned 
acts (Idsø & Jakobsen, 2000; Pearsall & Hanks, 2001). For purposes of simplicity, 
however, we will refer to physical and online security as safety throughout this document 
to highlight the connection between historic senses of safety (e.g., in our ancestral 
environment) and our modern-day sense of security.1 In this paper, we distinguish 
																																																						
1 Safety and privacy, on the other hand, are notably disparate concepts. Whereas privacy 
implies an ability to close a metaphorical door, safety or security implies being able to 
lock the door. Whereas the latter implies keeping unwanted others from breaking into—
or stealing personal belongings from—a private space (be it a home or online account), 
the former implies keeping those belongings in the hands of their proper owner. Although 
companies may promise that they will keep users’ information private from third parties, 
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between two forms of safety: safety in the physical environment, which carries cues of 
immediate threat, and safety in the online world, in which cues may be subtle or even 
unseen. To better understand online safety, it is important to first explore what we know 
about safety in the physical world, as well as the universal human motivation to detect 
and avoid threats in day-to-day life. 
 Self-protection motive. Abraham Maslow (1943) theorized a hierarchy of human 
needs, in which the basest of needs (i.e., physiological needs: water, food, metabolic 
requirements for survival) must supersede any needs that follow (e.g., love, belonging). 
Immediately following physiological needs, however, are safety needs—a drive for 
physical safety and security that has served as a fundamental human motive for millions 
of years (Kenrick et al., 2010). Evolutionary social psychology supports the idea that 
human thoughts and behaviors are often guided and regulated by these basic underlying 
motives. Just as mate acquisition and care of offspring speak to recurring ancestral 
problems, the self-protection motive speaks to a universal drive to detect, and protect 
oneself from, physical threat (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011). Past research 
suggests that individuals’ judgment and decision-making processes change when placed 
under a self-protection motivation, regardless of gender (Griskevicius et al., 2006; 
Griskevicius et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012). From angry faces to ambient darkness, both 
men and women consistently show increased sensitivity to potential threat when under a 
self-protection mindset (Becker et al., 2007; Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). 
																																																						
malicious players (e.g., hackers, disgruntled employees) may find ways to obtain that 
information anyway—which does not imply a breach of privacy, but rather a breach of 
security. 
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Of course, “threat” does not refer exclusively to bodily harm. Victims of burglary 
may never come into physical contact with the perpetrator, and therefore never 
experience a threat to their life;2 however, just as a stolen credit card might spur feelings 
of violation, the loss of resources (i.e., items of monetary or sentimental value) may 
certainly induce a sense of threat. Burglary, in this sense, stands as a less physically 
involved form of threat that may still pose severe impacts on a person’s ability to 
function in society. This form of threat, called resource threat, may challenge self-
protection, but it may also endanger other fundamental motives. For example, the status 
(or esteem) motive describes the universal drive to protect resources—monetary or 
otherwise—to preserve one’s status in society, possibly by lessening one’s lifestyle in 
outward-facing ways (i.e., conspicuous consumption; Kenrick et al., 2010; Veblen, 
1994). Although this universal drive entails protection against threat, it revolves 
exclusively around the loss of property, rather than potential loss of life. Of course, it 
could argued that resource threat may pose a much more significant threat than the ability 
to outwardly consume luxurious or status-related resources. Depending on one’s 
socioeconomic status, or on the magnitude of the resource threat itself, the loss of money 
or valuable items could pose a direct threat to one’s ability to pay for food, water, shelter, 
and other means of survival—that is, threats to physiological needs, which are paramount 
to human survival. Taken together, these two forms of threat—namely, self-protection 
																																																						
2 Here, we distinguish between the legal definitions of (1) burglary, entailing breaking 
and entering (e.g., into a person’s home) to steal, but without the added component of 
bodily threat; (2) larceny, or theft without necessarily trespassing onto a person’s 
property; and (3) robbery, meaning larceny with the added component of physical force 
or intimidation. 
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threat and resource threat—will serve as important constituents of our approach to safety 
in the present research, both on- and offline.  
Physical safety. Most broadly, we might imagine the physical world as a series of 
concentric circles surrounding the self, encompassing one’s neighborhood, society, 
country, and immediate international context. If we were to consider these concentric 
circles in terms of physical safety, we might consider a person’s ability to combat threat 
in the physical world as one’s (1) personal ability to protect oneself, (2) societal ability 
(e.g., neighborhood or municipality safety), and (3) national ability (military 
expenditures). For the present work, we define physical safety more broadly than 
freedom from bodily harm. Not only can safety imply protection of an individual’s 
monetary resources, but it can also be captured on a societal or national scale—for 
instance, through indices of military presence, homicide rates, federal bank robberies, and 
government infrastructure for basic protection. 
Online safety. In information and computer science, online safety is often 
conceptualized as the act of maximizing the user’s personal safety by recognizing and 
protecting against risks of data breaches (e.g., of personal information) while online. 
Such risks are usually posed by external actors that actively work against the user to 
undermine their safety; and just as an individual can lock his or her home to ensure 
physical security, so too can they take measures to increase their safety in cyberspace. 
Research in human-computer interaction suggests that factors such as visual design and 
website quality largely determine website trustworthiness (Grabner-Kräuter & Kaluscha, 
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2003; Ou & Sia, 2009; Yu & Singh, 2002);3 but although this body of past empirical 
work highlights the importance of the aesthetic of the digital world on perceptions of 
online safety, little is known about the roles—if any—played by threats in the physical 
world. Most broadly, and for the purposes of this research, we could conceptualize a safe 
online environment as a counterpart to a safe physical milieu: a cyberspace without 
concern of data breaches, or armed with heavy encryption to protect its users. 
Actual and perceived safety. The present work seeks to establish a connection 
between physical and online safety as they exist on a perceptual, psychological level. As 
such, it is important to first establish whether this connection exists in actuality, as will be 
investigated in Studies 1 and 2. After examining this relationship, we seek to extend this 
focus to the perceptual level in Studies 3 and 4. 
Safety is, by its very nature, an abstract concept: because it is advantageous to 
human survival for actual, objective physical threats to translate into conscious 
perceptions of those threats, it would follow that actual and perceived safety are 
positively related in the offline world. Humans have adapted over time to detect and 
avoid threat, and it has historically been imperative to survival that actual threats translate 
into perceived, mentally acknowledged risks to be avoided. This translation, however, 
might be less clear while online. When a user takes a pro-security measure in cyberspace 
(e.g., enabling a protective tool or security layer), there is rarely a visible threat, nor is 
																																																						
3 For example, when a website’s visual design is cluttered, difficult to navigate, or 
wrought with grammatical or spelling errors, users are more likely to view that website as 
a scam, and therefore more likely to engage in safety-seeking behaviors—for example, 
withholding personal (e.g., name, e-mail, phone number) and financial information 
(Banks, 2014; Fogg, 2003; Neff, 2003; Sillence et al., 2004). 
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there an immediate positive outcome. As such, we might predict that for a user to take 
such precautionary measures, they must first perceive a threat while online (West, 2008). 
The reward for acting upon online safety behaviors is only the lack of a detrimental 
outcome, and when there are few cues of threat online (as opposed to nearby theft or the 
sound of gunshots), this profitless pursuit may not seem worthwhile (West, 2008). As 
such, online safety is intricately tied with threat detection in the online world, which may 
come less naturally to human users than more historic cues of threat in our ancestral 
environments. 
 Whereas much of past research has gauged individual-level judgments of physical 
safety along Likert-type scales indicating fear of “getting murdered” or “being robbed” 
(Chong et al., 2012), online safety is often operationalized through actual indicators of 
online threat (e.g., prevalence of phishing and spam attacks, availability of secure Internet 
servers). Perceived online safety remains a conceptually distinct variable about which we 
know little. There is, therefore, a need to empirically study perceptions of online safety 
and the factors that may underlie it. 
The physical-online relationship. Although we can postulate a correlation 
between physical and online safety, such a relationship has not yet been demonstrated, 
and nor—if causal—has its potential directionality. Because the digital world has existed 
for a comparably short period of time relative to the physical world, one might speculate 
that cues of online threats stem from what humans have gathered across offline 
experiences, creating a causal relationship from the physical to the digital. 
However, we could just as readily imagine a situation in which the two are 
inversely related. For example, the seemingly innocuous act of sharing geotagged photos 
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during a weekend vacation indicates to other users—both friends and foes—lowered 
defenses and a vacant home. Just as personally identifiable information can be used to 
pinpoint a user’s identity, so too can geotagged or location-specific information uniquely 
track a user’s physical location, thereby endangering their physical safety or property. In 
this example, it is online safety that determines offline safety—the digital bleeds into the 
physical. 
We have thus far presented possible situations in which physical and online safety 
might be related, both in actuality and in individual-level perception. But regardless of its 
directionality, we cannot assume that an increase in one form of safety will predict an 
equivalent increase in the other; we do not contend that this hypothesized tie is a one-to-
one correlation. Not only should we expect all people to perceive threats in the same way, 
but it is unlikely that all threats will be perceived equally as threatening. Some people 
may tend to feel more or less threatened than others due to person-specific factors, or 
even aspects of their past or ongoing situation (i.e., context- or situation-specific factors). 
Similarly, there may be qualities of the threat itself that may uniquely threaten one 
individual, but not another. As such, we seek to explore whether there are person- and 
situation-specific factors relevant to threat perception that may alter the strength (or mere 
presence) of this relationship. 
Person- and Situation-Specific Factors 
 The Extended Parallel Process Model. In the realm of communications, the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM; Witte, 1998; 1994) breaks down the process of 
threat perception and evaluation as a product of both person- and situation-specific (i.e., 
threat-specific) factors: (1) perceived severity of the threat,	in which the type of threat 
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itself (e.g., self-protection or resource) may differ in the extent to which others view it as 
foreboding, or in which a threat might seem more or less probable; (2) an individual’s 
perceived susceptibility to that threat, which may, for the purposes of this research, be 
influenced by past experiences with physical or online threats (i.e., past victimization); 
and (3) his or her perceived efficacy in avoiding the threat,	which may stem from 
physical size or knowledge of safety precautions—self-defense experience or even digital 
literacy (Hullett & Witte, 2001). We further break down these constituents by whether 
they can be attributed to the person encountering the threat (person-specific factor) or the 
threat itself (situation-specific factor). 
Person-specific factors. Following this breakdown of threat perception, we might 
state that both threat susceptibility (e.g., past victimization, wealth) and efficacy in 
avoiding the threat (physical size, self-defense, digital literacy) comprise factors that are 
specific to the person. Even with all else held equal, individuals may respond to the same 
threats very differently if certain qualities alter their perceived susceptibility to falling 
victim to, or their efficacy in avoiding or controlling, the threat. Indeed, a wealth of past 
research in communications, psychology, and criminology suggests that physical 
safety—both in perception and in actuality—largely stems from: (1) demographic 
characteristics (i.e., sex, age, and socioeconomic status), (2) past victimization 
experiences, and (3) ability to defend oneself against threat. 
Demographic characteristics. Past research suggests that sex and age play large 
roles in both actual and perceived physical safety. Although women and older adults 
perceive higher threat in their day-to-day lives, men—especially from younger age 
groups—actually experience higher violence and victimization rates (Donnelly, 1989; 
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Janson & Ryder, 1983; Perkins, Brown, & Taylor, 1996; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; 
Toseland, 1982). In addition, individual- and community-level socioeconomic status has 
been found to be negatively related to physical risk perception (Austin, Furr, & Spine, 
2002; Simsek et al., 2014), as well as a sense of control over physical threats (Feldman & 
Steptoe, 2004). Research contends that this loss of perceived control is related to an 
increased sense of vulnerability and, therefore, susceptibility to the threat at hand (Simsek 
et al., 2014). As such, we might postulate that participants who are older, female, or hail 
from a lower socioeconomic background might chronically perceive a higher level of 
physical threat than actually exists. Research has yet to examine whether these factors 
predict lasting differences in perceived threat while online. 
Past victimization. Crime researchers have found that past victims of physical 
violence (e.g., robbery, assault) demonstrate markedly higher levels of perceived risk that 
remain stagnant long after victimization (Connor-Smith et al., 2010; Foster & Hagedorn, 
2014; Garofalo, 1979; Wolff & Shi, 2009). On the one hand, it is possible that such 
experiences might generalize from physical threat to perceived digital threat: A victim of 
burglary in the physical world may experience heightened fear of identity theft or credit 
card fraud online. However, we might just as readily imagine that victims of crime in one 
domain might turn to the other as a markedly disparate environment. Someone who has 
been robbed at gunpoint while walking home might avoid certain physical situations 
(e.g., running errands at night, going to unfamiliar places alone), all the while 
maintaining, or even increasing, their use of the online world—a milieu in which physical 
attacks are impossible. As such, their sense of online safety might remain relatively 
unchanged in the face of physical threats. Similarly, past victims of online crime—
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identity fraud, cyberstalking—might respond to the contextual cues that stem from these 
past online experiences by turning to the physical, disconnected world, such that their 
sense of physical safety remains independent of their sense of threat online. In either 
situation, we might speculate that past victimization is an important person-specific factor 
to explore. 
On- and offline self-efficacy. As might seem intuitive, individuals feel more 
efficacious in controlling or avoiding a physical threat if they are of a larger physical size 
than others of their gender or age group (Bailey, Caffrey, & Hartnett, 1976; Sell et al., 
2009). This means that on average, larger men are less likely to feel threatened than 
smaller women. However, research has found that increased knowledge of self-defense 
tactics improves fear response and perceived self-efficacy in avoiding threats for both 
males (Phillips & Rudestam, 1995) and females (McDaniel, 1993). 
We might also consider one’s ability to protect oneself online (e.g., digital 
literacy) as a similar form of self-efficacy. Stated differently, just as physical size may 
reinforce physical safety, so too might digital literacy act as a buffer for online safety. 
Researchers in information and computer science have attributed perceptions of online 
safety to differences in perceived self-efficacy (i.e., Could I protect myself if I wanted 
to?; Shillair et al., 2015). Indeed, efficacy beliefs—which largely stem from exposure to 
technology—are paramount in instilling a sense of control over perceived online threats 
(Lallmahamood, 2007; Lee, LaRose, & Rifon, 2008; O’Cass & Fenech, 2003; Witte et 
al., 1995). As such, if an individual is physically small and typically vulnerable to 
physical attack, this sense of physical threat may not necessarily translate into perceived 
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online threat if that same person is well-equipped to avoid danger while navigating the 
digital world. 
 Taken together, research defends the role that certain individual differences (i.e., 
person-specific factors) play in physical safety, with a particular emphasis on gender, past 
victimization, physical size, and ability to defend oneself (here, either on- or offline). 
Situation-specific factors. We also believe it important to consider situation- or 
context-specific factors that might play a role in the relationship between perceived 
physical and online safety. These factors may alter an individual’s subjective evaluation 
of the threat at hand, possibly through reinforcing a sense of resilience to the threat (e.g., 
judging a threat’s severity to be low) or the belief that a certain threat is unlikely to occur. 
Type of threat. For the purposes of the present research, we might consider the 
importance of type of threat on perceptions of threat severity. In particular, we have 
discussed two key forms of threats—self-protection threats and resource threats—and 
have postulated that because the former may pose a more direct threat to one’s survival 
(than, say, loss of money or valuable resources), self-protection threats may be seen as 
more severe, and more threatening, than resource threats. Although Studies 1, 2, and 3 
examine safety on a broader level—that is, across both types of threat—Study 4 examines 
this distinction more closely.  
Probability of threat. A second situation-specific factor worth considering is the 
probability that a threat will occur. For example, although Internet-facilitated crimes 
against children can be deemed highly severe and impactful threats, they occur very 
rarely compared with identity theft and phishing scams (IC3, 2015). Past research has 
substantiated the important role that threat probability plays in threat perception across a 
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variety of situations. For one, Fuller (1984) found that self-reported safe driving 
behaviors are largely based on the perceived probability that a crash will occur; similarly, 
Rogers and Mewborn (1976) found that people are more likely to avoid smoking and 
other unhealthy behaviors if cancer likelihood appears more probable. 
In one study by Rapee (1997), participants were shown a series of threat situations 
that were either physical (walking down a dark alley at night) or social in nature (being 
interviewed on live television). For each, they rated the probability and consequences of 
the threat, as well as the control they believed they would have in such a situation. 
Although fear of social threat stemmed from consequences of—and personal control 
over—the threat itself, the only predictor of fear in physical situations was the probability 
that the threat would occur at all. Furthermore, threat probability may, in some cases, be 
deemed even more important than threat severity, even in situations involving resource 
(rather than self-protection) threat: A social psychological study on threat avoidance 
illustrated that the most effective deterrent of tax evasion was considering the probability 
that an audit would occur, rather than the severity of the fines (Friedland, 1982). Even 
vague, potentially inaccurate information about audit probability was more powerful than 
exact (but low) probability information coupled with small fines. 
In summary, the EPPM outlines important qualities that guide human perceptions, 
or evaluations, of threats. We have differentiated these qualities by their specificity to the 
person or the situation, and speculate that—even with all else held equal—both sets of 
factors may alter the relationship between physical and online safety. We aim to explore 
the role that these qualities play in our individual-level, perception-based studies (i.e., 
Studies 3 and 4).  
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 Taken together, the key focus of this work is to examine the relationship between 
physical and online safety, both in actuality (on the national and state levels; Studies 1 
and 2) and in individual-level perception (Studies 3 and 4). In our first three studies, we 
examine a combination of threats to both self-protection and resources; in Study 4, we 
tease apart these types of threat to study the unique impacts of each in isolation. Lastly, 
and for exploratory purposes, we will also examine person- and situation-specific factors 
that may moderate or break down this relationship—namely, demographic 
characteristics, past victimization, self-efficacy, and probability of threat. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 We can thus break down our primary research questions by level of analysis, 
method of study, and distinction between actual and perceived safety. 
1. National and State, Correlational, Actual (Studies 1 and 2) 
 To examine the perceptual nature of the relationship between physical and online 
safety, we must first assess whether such a relationship exists in actuality. Thus, our first 
question regards the nature of the relationship between actual physical and actual online 
safety as they exist on the macro-level. Furthermore, we have previously discussed the 
importance of wealth on perceived susceptibility to a given threat; however, across 
nations and even U.S. states, one could conceptualize the role that wealth (e.g., gross 
domestic product) might play on a country’s ability to combat physical (e.g., military 
presence, homicide rate) and online threat (secure Internet servers): Wealthier countries 
can afford to invest monetary resources into militarization and homeland protection, just 
as they can invest in secure cyberinfrastructure. We are therefore interested in whether a 
relationship exists between quantifiable indicators of physical and online safety on the 
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macro-level, above and beyond the potential role that wealth might play. This first 
research question can be broken down into the following hypothesis: 
H1: We predict that, when controlling for macro-level indicators of wealth, 
actual physical safety will be positively related to actual online safety 
across both nations (H1A) and U.S. states (H1B). 
2. Individual, Correlational, Actual and Perceived (Study 3) 
 After establishing whether a relationship exists between actual, macro-level 
indicators of physical and online safety, we are interested in examining whether this link 
exists at the level of individual perceptions. As such, we first examine whether actual and 
perceived safety map on to one another by gauging the correlation between participant 
zip code safety and perceived safety of one’s neighborhood. Assuming a positive 
relationship between actuality and perception, we next assess whether a correlation 
between perceived physical safety (e.g., neighborhood safety) and perceived online safety 
exists. And third, we explore whether the relationship between physical and online safety 
depends on individual difference measures that have demonstrated relevance to threat 
perception in past research (i.e., physical size, past victimization experiences, self-
efficacy). This third research aim will primarily serve exploratory goals, and may help 
account for outliers in responses to our perceived safety measures. In sum, Study 3 will 
investigate the following hypotheses: 
H2: We predict that actual physical safety, as quantified by participant zip 
code, will demonstrate a positive correlation with perceived physical 
safety. 
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H3: We predict that perceived physical safety will be positively related to 
perceived online safety. 
H4: For exploratory purposes, we predict that person-specific factors related to 
threat perception will moderate or buffer the relationship between 
perceived physical and perceived online safety. 
3. Individual, Experimental, Perceived (Study 4) 
 For our fourth and final study, we are interested in expanding our 
understanding of the relationship between perceived physical and online safety by 
examining whether manipulations of one type of threat affect the other. More 
specifically, if we experimentally alter physical safety, does it impact perceived 
online safety? And does the opposite hold true, in which manipulations of online 
threat predict perceived physical safety? We conducted a 3 × 2 between-subjects 
test of this question, in which type of threat (self-protection threat vs. resource 
threat vs. control condition) and domain of threat (physical vs. online) are 
manipulated via random assignment to condition. 
 Manipulating physical vs. online threat. The goal of our experimental 
manipulations is to prime perceptions of threat in the physical or online world by 
increasing the salience of real-world crime or cybercrime. Past empirical work has 
primed perceived threat using guided visualization stories, also referred to as guided 
imagery. This technique was first empirically used in clinical psychology in the mid-
1980s to reduce anxiety and enhance work performance by imagining oneself in a 
situation that is less physically or psychologically threatening (Ayres & Hopf, 1985; 
1990; 1992). In the decades since, other areas of psychology have adopted guided 
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visualization as a strategy to increase the vividness and clarity of participants’ mental 
imagery through text-based prompts. 
In the realm of physical safety, extant work in evolutionary social psychology has 
primed self-protection motives through similar techniques (White et al., 2013; White, 
Kenrick, & Neuberg, 2013). One text-based scenario guides participants through a dark, 
windy evening spent alone at home. The story ends as the second-person subject 
(supposedly the participant) hears someone force open the front door and, just as the 
power goes out, hears footsteps slowly approach their bedroom. This story has been 
shown to activate motives of self-protection, which is precisely the aim of our physical 
threat manipulation. Other empirical works have primed self-protection motives through 
threat-related movie clips detailing murder, stalking, or robbery (e.g., Silence of the 
Lambs; Maner et al., 2005; White, 2014; Young, Slepian, & Sacco, 2015). 
Because Studies 1 and 2 examine actual safety through the prevalence of true 
crimes (e.g., intentional homicide, prevalence of identity theft), we manipulated physical 
threat through examples of what seem to be actual crimes in the community or online 
world. As such, we showed participants altered news stories detailing concrete, 
dangerous events that have purportedly happened in their close neighborhood. Rather 
than presenting them with guided visualization scenarios, these doctored news stories 
should prime decreased perceptions of physical safety in participants’ immediate 
environments, a prime that would be based on supposed actuality rather than imagination. 
Similarly, we manipulated online threat by presenting participants with altered news 
stories detailing examples of cybercrime that may put Internet users at risk. 
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 Manipulating type of threat. Although Studies 1, 2, and 3 conceptualize safety 
more broadly—namely, incorporating facets of safety that stem from both bodily threats 
(e.g., homicide rate, assault) and threats to valuable possessions (bank robberies, 
burglary)—we cannot assume that all threats are held equal on the individual, perceptual 
level. One situation-specific factor relevant to the present work is type of threat, 
distinguishing between self-protection threats and resource threats. In the hierarchy of 
fundamental motives, self-protection motives are more paramount to ensuring human 
survival than motives that fall higher in the pyramid. Although resource threats could 
endanger status motives through threatening one’s ability to outwardly display a 
particular lifestyle, these threats could also pose a threat to base physiological needs such 
as obtaining food and shelter—that is, needs that are even more paramount to survival 
than self-protection. As such, we would expect that these two types of threat will not 
generalize between physical and online domains in the same way; one type of threat may 
generalize more strongly, yielding a more positive physical-online relationship. 
Therefore: 
H5: We predict that type of threat (either self-protection or resource) will 
impact the physical-online relationship to differing degrees. 
We used two news stories as experimental manipulations: One article primed self-
protection threat by presenting participants with an alarming event that should induce a 
desire to protect oneself from bodily harm; the other primed resource threat by detailing 
the loss of monetary resources. We then altered—as minimally as possible, to maintain 
comparability between the two—each of these stories to apply to both the online and 
offline worlds. For example, a physical self-protection threat prime might discuss a 
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voyeur who spends many hours each day watching individuals from outside their homes; 
an online self-protection threat prime, however, might discuss a webcam hacker who 
spends the same number of hours each day watching individuals through their laptop 
cameras. Similarly, a physical resource threat prime could describe a series of burglaries 
where valuable possessions were stolen from multiple cars shortly after their owners had 
left; an online resource threat could outline a series of online bank account thefts. 
 For each of these primes, we aimed to manipulate only one type of threat at a 
time; our self-protection threat primes do not implicate monetary or valuable resources, 
and our resource threat primes do not pose direct physical harm. However, it is important 
to consider a key difference between physical and online threats in each of these 
situations. If a voyeur is watching a person’s every move in the physical world, the threat 
ends there. It may instill a sense of fear and alarm, and the person may feel that their 
survival is in danger, but the actual threat posed remains purely physical (even if a person 
were to generalize or “blur” that threat to the online world). The same can be said for 
physical resource threat: If a burglar were to break into a person’s house while they were 
away, the threat ends with the loss of valuable—but solely physical—resources. Online 
assets remain untouched and unthreatened. 
 If we were to consider online threats, however, this isolation of domain breaks 
down. A hacker who may be watching a person’s every move online could conceivably 
track his or her victim down in the physical world; the online threat could transform into 
a physical one. Similarly, an online resource threat such as credit card fraud or stealing 
from an online bank account yields a loss of resources that trickles into the physical 
world. The resources are, after all, monetary; they can be spent both online and offline. 
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Taken together, we might expect that threat domain will impact the degree to which 
perceived threat generalizes to the opposite domain. 
H6: We predict that threat domain—either physical or online—will impact the 
generalized relationship between perceived physical and online safety to 
differing degrees. 
And finally, we presented participants in control conditions (for either physical or 
online modalities) with a straightforward news story detailing either generic 
neighborhood news or basic news surrounding online developments (e.g., non-safety-
related app releases). Because these control conditions did not reference crime or prime 
threat, we have no reason to expect that reading a neutral news story will impact 
perceived safety in either modality, regardless of threat type; therefore, we do not predict 
an effect among participants in control conditions. 
Downstream safety behaviors. Beyond capturing perceptions of online and 
offline safety, we are also interested in the impacts of perceived threat on downstream 
safety behaviors—more specifically, whether a person is more likely to follow 
recommended safety practices after being made to feel threatened either online or offline. 
Our primary goal in examining intentionality to follow safety practices is to assess 
whether safer on- and offline behaviors can be encouraged immediately following reports 
of an attack. We might predict that participants assigned to a threat condition should 
experience heightened self-protection or status motives (i.e., compared with participants 
in control conditions), and will therefore show higher intentionality to act on safety 
practices. We might also expect that participants primed with online threat will be more 
likely to act on online safety practice recommendations due to the relevance between 
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primed threat and possible solution or defense, whereas those primed with physical threat 
will be more likely to act on physical safety practice recommendations. 
 We cannot assume that likelihood of following recommended safety practices will 
be equally appealing or even possible for all participants. For some, perceived self-
efficacy in following these behaviors may act as a barrier; for example, a participant with 
low digital literacy or comfort with technology might consider a recommendation to 
enable two-factor authentication on their e-mail account to be too technical to follow, 
which would limit that individual from carrying out this recommendation. Similarly, 
some participants may feel that particular types of safety recommendations are not 
efficacious in controlling or avoiding the threat at hand—not as a fault of the individual, 
but of the recommendation itself (i.e., response efficacy; Witte et al., 1995). As such, and 
for exploratory purposes, we will examine perceptions of response efficacy and self-
efficacy as they relate to these recommended safety practices. 
 Person- and situation-specific factors. As was the case in Study 3, we collected 
person- and situation-specific measures that may play a role in the physical-online 
relationship. In the realm of person-specific factors, we again examined demographic 
characteristics such as physical size, past victimization experiences, and self-efficacy in 
on- and offline self-defense. Because we are manipulating one of our two situation-
specific factors of interest (namely, type of threat: self-protection or resource), we 
examined another potentially important situational factor: participants’ estimated 
probability that the threat will occur to the individual him- or herself. These estimations 
could highlight threat-specific qualities that could impact perceived safety (e.g., credit 
card fraud might be seen as more probable than burglary, particularly among those who 
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live in physically safe neighborhoods). Finally, we presented participants with two 
subscales from Witte and colleagues’ (1995) Risk Behavior Diagnosis Scale that 
operationalize perceived susceptibility to the threat at hand (i.e., as a person-specific 
factor) as well as perceived threat severity (as a situation-specific, or threat-specific, 
factor). The inclusion of these two factors speaks directly to our interest in the EPPM as a 
building block for the factors that may alter or moderate the physical-online relationship. 
As was the case in Study 3, our broader interest in these person- and situation-specific 
factors is purely exploratory in nature, and may help explain any outliers in responses to 
our dependent variables; however, we could repeat Hypothesis 4 from our third study, 
which predicts that: 
H4: Person- and situation-specific factors related to threat perception may 
moderate or buffer the hypothesized physical-online relationship. 
 Outcome variables. To answer our primary research question, we observe 
whether those primed with physical threat demonstrate a higher sense of online threat, 
and whether the reverse holds true—in which those primed with online threats 
demonstrate higher perceived physical threat. In addition to examining perceived safety 
as an outcome variable, we also examined intentionality to act upon, or increase the use 
of, safety behaviors both on- and offline. We are interested in the behaviors people might 
demonstrate after being made to feel threatened, and whether these threats increase 
intentionality to protect oneself. 
Table 1 summarizes our four studies by design, independent and dependent 
variables, and hypotheses. 
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Table 1 
Summary of all studies: Design, variables, hypotheses 
Study  Details 
1. Design: 
IV: 
DV: 
H1A: 
Correlational, using national-level archival data 
Actual physical safety 
Actual online safety 
Actual physical safety is positively related to actual online safety 
on the national level, even when controlling for wealth 
2. Design: 
IV: 
DV: 
H1B: 
Correlational, using state-level archival data 
Actual physical safety 
Actual online safety 
Actual physical safety is positively related to actual online safety 
on the state level, even when controlling for wealth 
3. Design: 
IV: 
DV: 
H2: 
 
H3: 
 
H4: 
Correlational, self-report inventories 
Actual physical safety, perceived physical safety 
Perceived online safety 
Actual physical safety will be positively related to perceived 
physical safety 
Perceived physical safety will be positively related to perceived 
online safety 
Person- and situation-specific variables related to threat perception 
will moderate or buffer the physical-online relationship 
(exploratory) 
4. Design: 
IV: 
 
DV: 
 
H5: 
 
H6: 
 
H4: 
Experiment, 3 × 2 between-subjects 
Self-protection threat vs. resource threat vs. control (3 levels), 
physical vs. online (2 levels) 
Perceived safety (in the opposite domain of assigned condition), 
safety behavior intentionality 
Physical and online safety are more positively related in self-
protection threat conditions 
Physical and online safety are more positively related in online 
threat conditions 
(See Study 3) 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 The aim of this research is to better understand the relationship between safety in 
the physical world and perceptions of safety online. Taken together, these four studies 
seek to establish: 
(1) whether a connection exists between measures of physical and online safety in 
actuality, and on a global scale; 
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(2) whether an individual’s actual physical safety, as measured by zip code, is a 
positive reflection of his or her perception of physical safety; 
(3) whether perceptions of physical and online safety are positively correlated at a 
given point in time; 
(4) whether manipulations of physical or online threat predict perceptions of threat in 
the opposite modality; 
(5) the role that personal and situational factors relevant to threat perception play in 
the relationship between perceived physical and perceived online safety; and 
(6) the impact of physical or online threats on an individual’s intention to act upon, or 
educate themselves about, downstream safety practices. 
To expound upon this sixth and more applied aim, we are interested in using these 
findings to encourage safer online behaviors, or to increase awareness of potential threats 
when navigating the online world. When made to feel threatened, does a person’s 
intentionality to learn more about, and act upon, online safety practices increase? And if 
so, could organizations (e.g., IC3) immediately follow up on reported cyberattacks with 
suggested safety practices to increase attention to, and proactive steps toward, securing a 
safer cyberspace? 
And finally, how might we predict differences in the willingness to adopt these 
downstream behaviors as a function of physical situation? With respect to social 
networking sites, for example, these findings may guide the creation of new segmentation 
strategies to deliver catered lists of security settings to their users. Just as users of certain 
demographic profiles may change their password more frequently (e.g., by gender, age, 
employment status; Bryant & Campbell, 2006), so too might users from certain physical 
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settings (e.g., as judged by safety of zip code, city) benefit from a tailored security 
experience online. If a user’s zip code is associated with physical threat, and if we 
observe a connection with perceptions of online threat, they may be more likely to 
proactively avoid those threats in cyberspace, and more likely to seek out—and act 
upon—customized safety controls on their account. As such, we hope that our findings 
might help streamline this user process of discovering and carrying out online safety 
practices through segmenting users based on relevant demographic characteristics. 
In summary, we wish to update our social psychological understanding of the 
relationship between physical safety and online safety in an age when the average 
American adult spends most waking hours interacting with the digital world. More 
specifically, we are interested in whether, and when, the boundary between physical and 
digital breaks down in this highly digitally connected world. 
Study 1 
Our first study seeks to examine the relationship between actual physical and 
actual online safety on the national level, using archival variables and a correlational 
design. 
Method 
Materials 
 Actual physical safety. We operationalized physical safety through an objective 
composite measure called the Global Peace Index, first developed by the Institute for 
Economics and Peace in 2006 and updated annually. This index, which ranges from 
1.148 (most physically safe; Iceland) to 3.645 (most physically dangerous; Syria), ranks 
163 countries and 99.6 percent of the world’s population. It takes three key areas into 
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consideration: (1) Ongoing domestic and international conflicts (including deaths from 
internal conflict and impacts of terrorism), (2) militarization and internal suppression of a 
country’s citizens, and—weighted most heavily—(3) societal safety and security, 
including measures of homicide rate and likelihood of violent demonstrations.  
Actual online safety. We considered five operational markers of actual online 
safety on the national level: (1) the HE Index (HostExploit), a composite measure 
reflecting the extent of malware, spam, and botnet reported per country; (2) the number 
of secure Internet servers per 1 million people (The World Bank, 2015); (3) the number 
of attacks on a country’s specific domain (e.g., .au as an Australian domain); (4) the 
number of unique phishing domains detected per country (Antiphishing.org), and (5) the 
number of phishing attacks—separate from general attacks—on a country’s specific 
domain (Antiphishing.org). However, four of these five measures reflect potentially 
external attacks on a country’s internal online safety, rather than a country’s internal 
initiative to secure a safe online environment for its citizens. The countries highest in 
these four measures correlate strongly with political and governmental strife (e.g., the 
highest countries in the HE Index include Russia and the Ukraine) or government-
sponsored online corruption (the highest in phishing domains and domain attacks include 
the Central African Republic, Nigeria, and Libya). Unique phishing domains and raw 
number of phishing attacks are, understandably, highly indicative of national population, 
with Brazil and China scoring as the highest countries for both (r[184] = .442, p < .001).4 
																																																						
4 We tested these five indicators within Estonia, regarded as a global leader in 
cybersecurity (Hattem, 2014; Ilves, 2013; Kinstler, 2015) and within the 95th percentile 
worldwide of government commitment to cybersecurity (ITU, 2015). As might be 
expected, the HE Index did not provide a satisfactory illustration of Estonia’s online 
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 We therefore operationalized actual online safety through Secure Internet Servers, 
which reflects “an important element in investment decisions for both domestic and 
foreign investors,” namely, “how many companies conduct encrypted transactions over 
the Internet […], the use of encrypted transactions through extensive automated 
exploration, tallying the number of Web sites using a secure socket layer (SSL)” 
(Netcraft, 2015). 
Table 2 
Study 1: Partial correlations of country demographics and online safety 
 
HE Index Domain Attacks 
Unique 
Phishing 
Domains 
Phishing 
Attacks 
Secure 
Internet 
Servers 
Land Mass .142 -.058 .628*** .617*** -.129 
Land Mass per Capita -.182† .030 .068 .052 .140 
Population .275** -.116 .483*** .485*** -.025 
Population Density .086 .144 -.013 -.012 .094 
Urban Population -.025 -.132 .169 .176† -.089 
Rate of Urbanization -.131 .222* .029 .006 .150 
GINI5 -.177† .134 .188† .180† -.181† 
Unemployment Rate -.143 -.004 -.129 -.124 .015 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10; n = 90 
																																																						
safety: Their score of 66.3 was above average, and almost twice the median score of 
35.05 (n = 198), which may reflect recent and ongoing political strife in its immediate 
surroundings. They scored in the bottom quartile of domain attacks with a score of 3.6 
against a mean of 19.36 (n = 141), and their 24 unique phishing domains brings them to 
less than a fifth of the mean of 125.69 (n = 199). Lastly, Estonia placed within the top 
85th percentile in secure Internet servers with a score of 927.0, more than 25 times the 
median score of 36.0 (n = 199). Although Estonia’s placement along the HE Index may 
be a less valid indicator of online safety, it appears that secure Internet servers may be a 
close proxy. 
 
5 The GINI is a country-level indicator of income inequality across citizens, with high 
values indicating high inequality. 
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As is reflected in Table 2, which shows partial correlations of our five possible online 
safety variables (while holding GDP per capita constant), this measure was notably 
independent of country-specific demographics (e.g., land mass, population and 
population density, rate of urbanization) that may confound our hypothesized model. 
Overview of analysis 
The present paper concerns the relationship between physical and online safety 
above and beyond the impact of country-level wealth. Indeed, it is conceivable that both 
physical and online safety could be correlated with national wealth: wealthy nations can 
afford to provide highly trained police, military forces, and cyber-protection agencies to 
protect their citizens from harm. As such, all analyses described henceforth control for 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to better observe the unique impact of actual 
physical safety alone. This particular index, which is reported by the CIA World 
Factbook, compares GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, divided by population as of 
the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e., July 1) of 2015. 
Results and Discussion 
To assess whether actual physical safety and actual online safety were related, we 
examined the bivariate correlation between the two variables. As predicted in Hypothesis 
1A, Global Peace Index and Secure Internet Servers were strongly negatively related 
(r[156] = -.513, p < .001), evincing a strong positive relationship between physical and 
online safety—again, higher scores on the Global Peace Index indicate more physical 
danger, not safety. This relationship remained significant when controlling for GDP per 
capita, r(155) = -.308, p < .001. Table 3 depicts both bivariate and partial (controlling for 
GDP per capita) correlation coefficients for our three variables of interest. 
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Table 3 
Study 1: Bivariate and partial (controlling for GDP) correlations 
 Bivariate Partial  
 1. 2. 2.  
1. GDP per Capita — — — 
2. Global Peace Index -.499*** — — 
3. Secure Internet Servers .602*** -.513*** -.308*** 
   *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 Summarizing the findings from our macro-level Study 1, our primary 
hypothesis—namely, that physical safety would predict online safety—held true, even 
when controlling for GDP per capita. 
Study 2 
 Our second study seeks to replicate the design and hypotheses of Study 1, but on 
the state level; it examines whether a positive relationship existed between indices of 
actual physical and actual online safety, even when holding state-level wealth constant. 
Method 
Materials 
 Actual physical safety. We assessed actual physical safety along three federally 
published indices that captured various forms of safety in day-to-day life within the 
United States; more specifically, these three indices spoke to violence against people, 
against property, and against federal entities (e.g., banks). The FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2015; 2016; Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, 2017) has published (1) 
an index of violent crime (rate per 100,000), which takes into account offenses of murder, 
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault per state (M = 379.86, SD = 186.69); (2) an index 
of property crime, including burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft (again, rate 
per 100,000; M = 2,854.33, SD = 606.76); and (3) a count of bank robberies (M = 78.84, 
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SD = 90.23), including theft from any national or state member bank of the Federal 
Reserve. 
 Actual online safety. Similarly, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3, 
2015) releases an annual report of filed complaints for 35 different types of cybercrime 
(e.g., phishing, malware, personal data breach, government impersonation), separated by 
the state where each victim and—if known—perpetrator lives. We collected indices 
detailing (1) the number of victims of cybercrime per state (divided by population to 
create a victim rate; M = 0.0007, SD = 0.00024), (2) the number of perpetrators of 
cybercrime per state (again, controlling for population; M = 0.0004, SD = 0.00037), (3) 
an overall index of identity theft complaint rate per 100,000 (M = 79.59, SD = 28.78), and 
(4) a credit card fraud complaint rate (M = 12.20, SD = 5.00). We saw it prudent to more 
specifically examine identity theft and credit card fraud because they comprise two major 
forms of cybercrime in the United States and, furthermore, are highly nondiscriminatory 
in nature (i.e., anyone with a credit card and/or a legal identity can become a victim).6 
Overview of analysis 
 As was the case in Study 1, we are interested in the relationship between macro-
level indicators of actual physical and actual online safety, above and beyond the effects 
that wealth might play on these constructs. As such, we controlled for Gross State 
Product (GSP) as published by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (2015). 
																																																						
6 Although credit card fraud has existed long before public access to the World Wide 
Web (e.g., through ATM tampering or through phishing scams facilitated through phone 
conversations), its prevalence has grown exponentially with the aid of digital connection 
and malware (Holmes, 2015). 
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Results and Discussion 
 Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the bivariate and partial (i.e., controlling for GSP) 
correlation matrices, respectively, of our variables of interest. 
Table 4 
Study 2: Bivariate correlations of variables of interest 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Violent crime — — — — — — — 
2. Property crime .660*** — — — — — — 
3. Bank robberies .011 -.059 — — — — — 
4. Victims of 
cybercrime .571*** .235† .107 — — — — 
5. Perpetrators of 
cybercrime .659*** .469*** -.054 .445*** — — — 
6. Identity theft .426** .498*** .456*** .415** .348* — — 
7. Credit card fraud .442*** .281* .657*** .470*** .446*** .804*** — 
8. Gross state 
product .020 -.037 .939*** .061 -.048 .367** .591*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 49 
 
 Table 5 evinces few significant relationships between GSP and our physical 
safety variables, with the exception of bank robberies (r[49] = .939, p < .001); however, 
we see a strong positive relationship between wealth and both identity theft rates (r[49] = 
.367, p = .008) and credit card fraud rates (r[49] = .591, p < .001). 
Table 5 
Study 2: Partial correlations (controlling for GSP) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Violent crime — — — — — — 
2. Property crime .661*** — — — — — 
3. Bank robberies -.023 -.068 — — — — 
4. Victims of 
cybercrime .571*** .238† .145 — — — 
5. Perpetrators of 
cybercrime .661*** .468*** -.026 .450*** — — 
6. Identity theft .451*** .551*** .348* .422** .394** — 
7. Credit card fraud .533*** .376** .367** .538*** .588*** .783*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 48 
 
 Of interest to our central hypothesis, we observed consistently strong, positive 
correlations between our physical safety variables and our online safety variables, with 
only two nonsignificant exceptions (i.e., bank robberies and victims of cybercrime, r[49] 
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= .107, p > .05, ns; bank robberies and perpetrators of cybercrime, r[49] = -.054, p > .05, 
ns). The average correlation coefficient across these 12 relationships was r(49) = .405 (p 
= .004). These trends were mirrored after controlling for GSP: the two nonsignificant 
relationships remained nonsignificant, but otherwise, all correlations between physical 
and online safety measures remained highly positive (mean r[48] = .395, p = .005). In 
support of Hypothesis 1B, we observed a positive relationship between indicators of 
actual physical safety and actual online safety across U.S. states, even after controlling 
for state-level wealth. 
Study 3 
 Study 3 seeks to extend the focus of Studies 1 and 2 to the individual, perceptual 
level by examining whether (1) actual physical safety maps onto perceived physical 
safety, whether (2) perceived physical safety is positively related to perceived online 
safety, and—for exploratory purposes—whether (3) person- and situation-specific factors 
related to threat perception will moderate or buffer the physical-online relationship. 
Method 
Participants 
 Our sample comprised 1,687 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at a large, public institution. Survey items were presented as part of a 
larger prescreening battery, which students could complete for partial research credit. Of 
this sample, 48.8 percent were female with a mean age of 19.43 (SD = 2.67); 56.3 percent 
were White, 16.3 percent Hispanic/Latino, and 8.2 percent East Asian. 81.4 percent self-
reported that they hailed from at least a middle-class background. 
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Materials 
 Actual physical safety. To measure actual physical safety of participants’ physical 
surroundings, we asked participants to report the zip code of their permanent home at the 
end of the survey. Trained research assistants coded each zip code for three measures of 
actual safety, released by the FBI across local police departments and municipalities and 
standardized by Move, Inc. (2017). Move, Inc. releases city profiles separated by zip 
code, which include standardized indices of total crime risk, personal crime risk, and 
property crime risk; for each, a score of 100 reflects the national average, whereas a score 
of 50 indicates half the national crime risk, 200 indicates twice the national risk, and so 
forth. Scores were based on seven years’ worth of demographic and geographic analyses 
of zip code-specific crime. 
 Total crime risk represents the combined risks of rape, murder, assault, robbery, 
burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft—that is, an amalgamation of both self-protection 
threats and resource threats. The various types of crime were given equal weight in this 
publicly available measure, so murder—for example—was not weighted more or less 
heavily than vehicle theft. Personal crime risk represented the combined risks of rape, 
murder, assault, and robbery; property crime risk reflected the combined risks of 
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. 
 After data entry, these index scores were randomly spot-checked for accuracy and 
reverse-coded to indicate physical safety (total, personal, property), rather than risk, by 
computing ((max+1)–x) for each value where x indicates the raw score, subtracted from 
one point more than the maximum possible value. 
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 Perceived physical safety. We gauged perceptions of physical safety through 
Austin, Furr, and Spine’s (2002) four-item index of “perception of safety in one’s 
neighborhood” (p. 420). Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement (e.g., People in my neighborhood can leave their 
personal property outside and unattended without fearing that it will be damaged or 
stolen) along a 7-point Likert-type scale. Furthermore, participants were instructed to 
think of their permanent home (i.e., the home corresponding to their provided zip code) 
while answering these items. Because these items demonstrated acceptable reliability 
within our sample (α = .76; DeVellis, 2012), we formed a single averaged composite 
across these four items, the descriptive statistics for which are portrayed in Table 7. 
 Perceived online safety. To capture perceptions of online safety, it was important 
that we confine our definition of safety to one form of online interaction. Whereas our 
indices of actual and perceived physical safety tapped into safety in participants’ own 
neighborhoods, we ran the risk that online safety—measured most broadly—could be 
interpreted to mean safety while texting, using third-party applications, surfing the 
Internet, performing online banking transactions, sending e-mails, or participating in 
multiplayer online games. Each of these examples may certainly pertain to perceptions of 
safety and threat in cyberspace; however, it would be impossible to tease apart variations 
in participant responses if we lacked specificity surrounding the nature of the online 
interaction. As such, and given the increasing universality of social networking use,7 we 
assessed perceptions of online safety while using social networking sites (SNSs). 
																																																						
7 As of November, 2016, approximately 80 percent of online adults actively used 
Facebook (Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016), with as many as a third of adults using 
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We therefore asked participants to report which SNSs they used or visited at least 
once a month out of Facebook, Google+, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Snapchat.8 On the 
next screen, we displayed Flavián and Guinalíu’s (2006) index of perceived website 
security, which builds off O’Cass and Fenech (2003) and measures participants’ 
agreement with statements such as This website has enough security measures to protect 
my personal information. For each statement, which we altered to refer to “these 
websites” (i.e., in plural form), we asked participants to answer based on the website(s) 
they had selected on the previous page. Responses to these six items showed high internal 
consistency (α = .88), and we formed a single composite variable averaging across all 
items. 
 Past victimization. We used Thompson, Bankston, and St. Pierre’s (1992) index 
of property victimization (Have you or a household member ever been a victim of theft or 
burglary (either when you were at home or away from home?) and personal victimization 
(Have you or a household member ever been a victim of assault/battery, robbery, or 
murder?). Responses to these two binary items were summed so that a score of 1 
																																																						
Instagram, LinkedIn, or other major social networking sites. Whereas even basic Internet 
surfing cannot be standardized across individuals (no two users visit the same websites or 
conduct the same online transactions), interactions with these major SNSs form a more 
uniform set of interactions. Finally, although e-mail could arguably be more universal 
than SNS use, we cannot assume that perceived online safety is comparable between 
Gmail, Apple iCloud, AOL, and city-specific, Internet Service Provider-given email 
clients. 
 
8 We specified a timeframe of one month to control for situations including, for example, 
Google+’s 2.5 billion-user platform on which more than 90 percent of users have never 
posted a single piece of content. We chose these SNSs based on popularity (Moreau, 
2016), excluding social media—rather than social networking—sites (e.g., Twitter, 
YouTube, Pinterest). 
  37 
indicated that the participant (or a household member) had never been a victim of either 
crime; 2 indicated victimization of at least one type of crime; and 3 indicated 
victimization of both types of crime. We further adapted these items to pertain to online 
victimization, in which theft/burglary was adapted to Have you … victim of identity theft? 
and assault/battery was adapted to Have you … victim of cyberbullying or cyberstalking? 
Frequencies of responses to these items are displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Study 3: Frequencies of physical and online victimization 
Frequency of 
victimization Neither One Both 
Physical victimization 57.1%, n = 719 33.4%, n = 421 9.5%, n = 120 
Online victimization 69.1%, n = 871 25.5%, n = 25.5 5.4%, n = 68 
 
 Demographic variables. At the end of the survey, we asked a series of 
demographic items (including participant zip code) that addressed our individual 
difference variables of interest. Participants reported their physical size as a comparison 
against “the average person of your sex (male/female)” on a 7-point scale from Much 
smaller than average to Much larger than average; their height; their self-defense 
expertise (e.g., taekwondo, karate) on a 5-point scale from None at all to A great deal; 
and a two-item index of web-oriented digital literacy from Hargittai (2005). Both digital 
literacy items were tailored to address skill surrounding online security, distinguished by 
whether the skill was concentrated around the Internet (In terms of your Internet skills 
(e.g., changing privacy or security settings in your browser), do you consider yourself to 
be…) or the computer more broadly (In terms of your computer skills (e.g., securing your 
computer against viruses or safety threats), do you consider yourself to be…). 
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Participants responded along 5-point Likert-type scales that ranged from Not at all skilled 
to Expert. 
Table 7 
Study 3: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest 
Variable Mean SD N 
Total safety (inverse of total crime risk) 426.63 72.27 1196 
Personal safety (inverse of personal crime risk) 423.96 59.71 1196 
Property safety (inverse of property crime risk) 512.47 81.92 1196 
Perceived physical safety 5.43 2.07 1262 
Perceived online safety 4.49 1.89 1251 
Physical size; 7-point scale 4.07 1.13 1255 
Height; inches 67.70 4.47 1254 
Self-defense expertise; 5-point scale 1.90 1.02 1259 
Digital literacy: Internet; 5-point scale 3.46 0.84 1261 
Digital literacy: Computer; 5-point scale 2.89 0.94 1262 
 
Table 7 displays basic descriptive statistics for our variables of interest in Study 3, 
including mean, standard deviation, and sample size values. All study materials, 
including all scales and indices, are displayed in Appendix A. IRB approval for this study 
is displayed in Appendix B.9 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 8 depicts a bivariate correlation matrix of our key variables of interest. We 
saw a positive relationship between actual safety and perceived physical safety (r[1194] = 
.187, p < .001) but not between actual safety and perceived online safety (r[1184] = .008, 
p > .05, ns); in addition, we saw a positive relationship between perceived physical and 
perceived online safety, r(1249) = .130, p < .001. Past victimization experiences (in both 
online and offline settings) were negatively related to perceived physical and perceived 
online safety (-.195 ≤ r[1247-1258] ≤ .070, .001 ≤ p ≤ .013). Taller individuals tended to 
																																																						
9 Because Studies 1 and 2 necessitated the use of publicly available archival data, IRB 
approval was not required. 
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feel more safe (r[1252] = .113, p < .001), although self-reported physical size did not 
appear to play a role in perceived physical or online safety. Those who self-reported that 
they were more digitally literate tended to feel more safe both online (r[1248] = .102, p < 
.001) and offline (r[1259] = .091, p = .001). 
Table 8 
Study 3: Correlation matrix of variables of interest 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Actual safety — — — — — — — — 
2. Phys safety .187*** — — — — — — — 
3. Online safety .008 .130*** — — — — — — 
4. Victim: phys -.051 -.195*** -.075** — — — — — 
5. Victim: online -.012 -.082** -.070** .220*** — — — — 
6. Height .060* .113*** -.016 -.015 -.074** — — — 
7. Physical size -.036 -.029 -.010 .023 .030 .509*** — — 
8. Self-defense .023 -.022 -.070** .053† .001 .190*** .136*** — 
9. Digital lit. -.021 .091*** .102*** -.037 -.012 .166*** .091*** .154*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 1186 ≤ n ≤ 1261 
 
 Actual physical safety. As is evident in Table 8, our second hypothesis held that 
actual physical safety would be a positive reflection of perceived physical safety, in 
which people who live in safer neighborhoods should report feeling safer in their day-to-
day lives. We found that this was indeed the case, even when controlling for self-reported 
wealth (i.e., annual household income; r[1192] = .154, p < .001). As such, we found 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
 The physical-online relationship. Hypothesis 3 further extended our findings 
from Studies 1 and 2 by predicting a positive physical-online relationship on the level of 
individual perception. Supporting this hypothesis, we saw not only a positive bivariate 
correlation between these perceptions, but also a significant partial correlation when 
holding wealth constant, r(1247) = .126, p < .001. Of secondary interest is the website, or 
websites, of which participants were thinking when they responded to our perceived 
online safety scale. A majority of participants reported that they used Snapchat, 
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Facebook, and Instagram at least once a month (62.8%, 61.3%, and 61.1%, respectively), 
with significantly fewer using Google+ (26.6%) and LinkedIn (15.5%). As such, 
responses to our online safety measure are more likely to pertain to perceptions of safety 
when using Snapchat, Facebook, and Instagram; and indeed, approximately half (48.9%) 
of all participants used all three major services. Only 4.7 percent of participants used all 
five in a typical month. 
 It is noteworthy that although actual physical safety was related to perceived 
physical safety, and perceived physical safety was related to perceived online safety, we 
did not observe a direct relationship between actual physical safety and perceived online 
safety. Indeed, a test of the mediating impact of perceived physical safety on the 
relationship between actual physical safety and perceived online safety yields a 
significant mediation model (Sobel = 3.74, p < .001) with highly significant paths from 
predictor to mediator and mediator to outcome; however, no direct relationship appears 
between offline actuality and online perception. This mediation model is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Study 3: Mediation of actual and perceived physical safety and perceived online safety 
 
 Person- and situation-specific factors. Hypothesis 4 sought to explore the 
possibility that person- and situation-specific factors related to threat perception might 
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moderate or buffer this positive relationship between perceived physical and perceived 
online safety. We used Hayes and Matthes’s (2009) computational procedure for probing 
interactions in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, displayed in equation form in 
Equation 1 below. Here, 𝑌 stands for our dependent variable, perceived online safety; X 
represents our key predictor of interest, perceived physical safety; and M represents any 
given person- or situation-specific factor that may act as a moderator variable. Our 
interaction term is reflected as a product terms (e.g., the interaction of X and M takes the 
form of XM), and b0 represents the intercept of each regression line, where b1-3 represents 
the slope of each respective term. 𝑌 = b1X + b2M+ b3XM + b0 (1) 
 Through this procedure, we observed a significant interaction of past 
victimization experiences of physical crime (e.g., burglary, robbery) whereby past victim 
status played no role in perceived online safety among those who felt highly safe in their 
physical environments (bnot victim = .059, p > .05, ns). It was only among those who felt 
very unsafe in day-to-day life where past victim status made a difference (R2 = .023, 
F[3,1245] = 9.658, p < .001; bvictim1 = .108, p < .001; bvictim2 = .156, p < .001).10 For past 
victims in unsafe physical environments, perceived offline safety was significantly lower; 
we observed a much sharper decline in perceived online safety with decreases in physical 
safety. 
 
 
																																																						
10 The subscripts accompanying our b coefficients indicate whether the participant has 
been a victim of one type of physical crime (victim1) or both in the scale (victim2).  
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Figure 2 
Study 3: Moderation of past victim status, physical 
 
 This moderation model (binteraction = .073, p = .05), which is displayed in Figure 2, 
may suggest that individuals who have been victimized in the past more readily “blur” or 
generalize a sense of threat in one domain to the other, possibly to prepare for future 
attack. If so, this strategy may prove useful in allocating precautionary attention to other 
domains in which a threat might appear. 
We also found a marginally significant moderation effect of digital literacy skills 
surrounding computer security—namely, securing one’s computer against viruses or 
safety threats (binteraction = .048, p = .065, marginal). More specifically, and as is shown in 
Figure 3, digital literacy did not affect perceived online safety among those who felt 
physically unsafe. But as perceived physical safety increased, those who reported that 
they were highly digitally literate were those who felt significantly safer online (R2 = 
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.023, F[3,1247] = 9.738, p < .001; bhigh = .162, p < .001); the physical-online relationship 
grew increasingly positive among these individuals. 
Figure 3 
Study 3: Moderation of digital literacy, computer security 
  
 Lastly, we observed a marginal interaction of our actual physical safety composite 
on the physical-online relationship (R2 = .020, F[3,1182] = 7.998, p < .001; binteraction = -
.001, p = .084, marginal); probing further, we found that the moderating impact of 
personal safety—determined by participant zip code—was responsible for this 
interaction. Indeed, whereas total safety and property safety held no moderating role on 
the physical-online relationship (binteraction = .164 and .277, respectively; p > .05, ns), 
personal safety yielded a significant disordinal (i.e., crossover) interaction, binteraction = -
.001, p = .004. 
Figure 4 illustrates this moderation effect, in which increases in perceived 
physical safety yielded no impact on perceived online safety among participants who 
lived in zip codes devoid of rape, murder, assault, and robbery (R2 = .025, F[3,1182] = 
  44 
10.000, p < .001; bhigh = .047, p > .05, ns). Among participants in mean- or low-safety 
neighborhoods, however, we saw our predicted positive relationship between physical 
and online safety: Increases in actual physical safety yielded an increasingly positive 
relationship between the two (bmean = .122 and blow = .197, respectively; p < .001). 
Figure 4 
Study 3: Moderation of actual physical safety, personal 
 
 We observed no additional moderation effects of our person- or situation-specific 
factors of interest on the relationship between perceived physical and perceived online 
safety. We therefore found partial support for Hypothesis 4, in which past victim status 
(namely, of physical crime), digital literacy surrounding computer security, and actual 
physical safety of one’s neighborhood moderated the physical-online relationship. 
Study 4 
 Our fourth and final study sought to examine the directionality of the tie between 
physical and online safety by examining whether manipulations of physical safety 
impacting perceived online safety, as well as the opposite, in which manipulations of 
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online safety informed perceptions of physical safety. We also sought to test the differing 
roles that type of threat played on the physical-online relationship: Whereas Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 operationalize threat in self-protection (i.e., bodily harm: assault, murder) and 
resource domains (burglary, bank robbery), Study 4 separates these two types of threat to 
assess the unique role that each plays on the generalized nature of threat between physical 
and online domains. 
We therefore conducted an experiment with a 3 × 2 between-subjects design, in 
which type of threat (3 levels: self-protection threat, resource threat, control) and threat 
domain (physical, online) were manipulated. Furthermore, and for exploratory purposes, 
we again examine the role that certain person- and situation-specific factors play on this 
relationship. Finally, we explore the impact of perceptions of threat on inclination to act 
upon recommended safety practices both on- and offline. 
Method 
Participants 
 Whereas our third study utilized a sample of undergraduate students, our fourth 
study comprised individuals (“Turkers”) who participate in online studies through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) in exchange for monetary compensation. To avoid 
potential confounds of national culture, we required that participants currently reside in 
the United States and be at least 18 years of age. After running a small pilot study (N = 
30) to ensure correctly programmed randomization, display logic, and skip logic within 
our Qualtrics study, we calculated that the a priori sample size needed for Study 4 should 
be N = 650 to obtain desired statistical power (1–β = 0.80) across six conditions with an 
expected effect size of Cohen’s d = .150. 
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 Our final sample on Mturk comprised 656 individuals (52.1% female) with the 
modal age range between 25 and 34 years old. (84.1% of our sample was younger than 55 
years of age.) 75.2 percent were White, 9.1 percent Asian, and 7.2 percent Black or 
African American; and 46.2 percent self-reported an annual household income between 
$20,000 and $60,000. It took Turkers an average of 7.59 minutes (SD = 4.62) to complete 
the study. Participants were randomly assigned more or less evenly across the six 
conditions (15.7-17.2% per condition).11 
Procedure 
 To avoid introducing demand characteristics to the study—namely, subtle cues 
that hint to participants what the experimenter is hoping to find—each participant saw a 
single prompt at the beginning of the study that read, We’re interested in the impact of 
information processing on decision-making strategies. Please read the following article 
carefully. When you’ve finished reading, we will ask comprehension questions about the 
article. This purported focus on information processing and decision-making was meant 
to mislead participants’ expectations as to the nature of the experiment. Upon moving 
forward, participants were randomly assigned to one of our six conditions with equal 
presentation (i.e., the randomization was programmed to allot 16.67% of participants into 
each condition, rather than a purely random assignment). Those assigned to a physical 
condition were asked to Imagine that the following article describes events happening in 
																																																						
11 More specifically, 16.0% (n = 105) were randomly assigned to the physical self-
protection threat condition, 17.5% (n = 115) to the physical resource threat condition, and 
15.7% (n = 103) to the physical control condition. 17.1% (n = 112) were randomly 
assigned to the online self-protection threat condition, 16.5% (n = 108) to the online 
resource threat condition, and 17.2% (n = 113) to the online control condition. 
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your community; those in online conditions were asked to Imagine that the following 
article describes events that actually happened. The threat manipulation that followed 
was altered to look like a news article participants might encounter online, following the 
style elements of USAToday.com but with the fictitious name The Courier Sun.12 
 On the next page, participants answered a single attention check item that asked, 
Which of the following best describes the article you just read? The six answer choices 
each described our six manipulations in 9-15 words. Of our sample, 96.8 percent 
correctly answered this attention check item; because we might expect that the remaining 
3.2 percent (n = 22) did not read the manipulation (and indeed, these individuals spent an 
average of 48.06 fewer seconds on the manipulation screen)13, they were excluded from 
all further analysis.14 
Participants then answered all outcome variables pertaining to perceptions of 
safety,15 intention to act upon safety practices, person- and situation-specific factors, and 
demographic characteristics. Table 9 depicts a breakdown of this survey flow, where 
																																																						
12 When this paper was written, no news source existed under the name The Courier Sun; 
one fictional exception is the community newspaper in Leave it to Beaver. 
13 In two of the five conditions for which at least one participant provided an inaccurate 
answer, we saw a significant difference in time spent on each manipulation, 2.186 ≤ 
t(112) = ≤ 2.956, .004 ≤ p ≤ .031. 
 
14 All sample descriptive statistics reported above (e.g., mean age, ethnicity frequencies) 
pertain to only those participants who passed the attention check item (total N = 703, with 
53 partial cases). 
 
15 Participants will view the batteries of perceived safety (physical, online, financial) in 
their assigned—or “matched”—domain; for example, participants assigned to a physical 
threat condition will first respond to items gauging perceived physical safety, followed by 
their perceived online safety (unmatched domain). Items pertaining to financial safety 
always appeared last. 
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columns represent order of presentation for each section of the study (from top to 
bottom). 
Table 9 
Study 4: Survey flow 
Random 
Assignment 
Physical Online 
Self-
protection Resource Control 
Self-
protection Resource Control 
News Story 
Prime 
In-person 
voyeur 
Series of 
car 
burglaries 
Neighbor-
hood 
develop-
ment 
news  
Webcam 
hacker 
voyeur 
Series of 
bank 
account 
burglaries 
App 
develop-
ment 
news 
Attention Check: Single-item “quiz” to ensure participant attention 
Outcome: 
Matched 
Safety 
Perceived physical safety Perceived online safety 
Outcome: 
Unmatched 
Safety 
Perceived online safety Perceived physical safety 
Safety practice intentionality (online and offline) 
Person- and situation-specific factors: e.g., past victimization, self-efficacy, threat 
probability 
Demographic characteristics 
 
Materials 
 Threat primes. Our threat primes were modeled very closely after existing news 
articles published in USA Today, Q13 Fox (Seattle), and WeLiveSecurity priming control 
conditions, resource threat, and self-protection threat, respectively (Cluley, 2015; Daykin, 
2017; Romero, 2017). These three articles were altered to pertain to either the online or 
offline world, using the same language, sentence structure, and topic flow between both 
stories to maintain the highest possible comparability between physical and online 
conditions. For example, Webcam hacker spent up to 12 hours a day watching his victims 
(online, self-protection) was altered to pertain to Neighborhood voyeur spent up to 12 
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hours a day watching his victims (physical, self-protection). The six articles comprised an 
average of 211.17 words (SD = 7.03), and all proper nouns—names, companies, 
locations—were altered to fictitious equivalents. It took participants an average of 79.87 
seconds (SD = 81.77 seconds) to read these primes.16 
 Perceived threat. In Study 3, we operationalized perceived physical safety and 
perceived online safety more generally: For neighborhoods, we examined the extent to 
which a person’s neighborhood was perceived to feel safe (e.g., belief of safety from 
bodily harm or stolen property); for the online world, we examined perceptions of safety 
while navigating major social media sites (e.g., belief that personal information was safe 
from data breaches). However, in Study 4, our aim was to capture perceptions of safety as 
they resulted from a recently encountered manipulation, rather than safety more 
generally; that is, we wanted to tap into immediate senses of threat, risk, and worry rather 
than stagnant perceptions of safety in one’s permanent neighborhood or general 
Facebook experiences. As such, we used the Financial Threat Scale (FTS) from 
Marjanovic and colleagues (2013), which was developed to cover a wide breadth of 
perceived threats, uncertainties, and preoccupations, rather than just financial concerns. 
This five-item measure was mirrored across topics of physical threat, online 
threat, and financial threat by altering the target language in each item. For example, the 
prompt asked participants to indicate how you feel at this moment about your personal 
safety (i.e., in your day-to-day life) (physical), …about your online safety (i.e., while 
																																																						
16 Our notably high standard deviation stemmed from one participant who took 35.38 
minutes to proceed to the next page. This participant passed our attention check and did 
not score as an outlier on any variable of interest, so was thus kept for all further 
analyses. 
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using technology) (online), or …about your financial safety (i.e., from someone stealing 
from you). Subsequent items were phrased to refer to the original target (safety type): 
How much does your (personal/online/financial) safety feel at risk? or How much does 
your (personal/online/financial) safety feel threatened?. All answer choices fell along a 
five-point Likert-type scale from Not at all to A great deal. 
Because our physical threat (M = 2.22, SD = 0.92), online threat (M = 2.67, SD = 
0.88), and financial threat (M = 2.74, SD = 1.10) scales demonstrated very strong 
reliability for five-item scales (α = .94, .92, and .95, respectively), we formed averaged 
composites for each. 
Safety practice intentionality. After reporting perceptions of safety, participants 
viewed a page titled Tips to Stay Safe. This first page contained three recommended 
practices, written in an educational format, with links to webpages or applications that 
assist in online safety (e.g., preventing identity theft and phishing, adding two-factor 
authentication to e-mail or social networking accounts) and physical safety (avoiding 
physical altercations or other physical threats), alternating between the two safety 
domains. These tips were, on average, 63.43 words in length (SD = 13.31 words). For 
each tip, there was a question asking participants’ likelihood of following the 
recommendation along a 6-point Likert-type scale. At the end of the page, participants 
had the option to view more tips; if they selected Yes, they viewed up to three more pages 
of an identical format, alternating between online and offline safety tips. If they selected 
No, they were redirected to the next section of the study. For each page of safety 
practices, we collected length of time spent on this instructional page, actual clicking 
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behaviors following the embedded links, and the number of pages they read (between 1 
and 4). 
Regardless of the number of pages participants chose to visit, the section ended 
with the response efficacy and self-efficacy subscales of Witte and colleagues’ (1995) 
Risk Behavior Diagnosis (RBD) Scale. These items gauged the extent to which 
participants felt that the tips would be effective in avoiding personal or online harm (e.g., 
If I follow these tips, I am less likely to be attacked; α = .86)—that is, response efficacy—
as well as the extent to which participants felt that they had the ability or resources to act 
on the tips (I have the skills to follow these tips to stay safe; α = .89)—that is, their self-
efficacy. 
Table 10 displays basic descriptive statistics concerning participants’ 
consumption of these safety practices, including the percentage of participants who 
viewed each page; the amount of time spent on each page; the total number of times 
participants clicked on a link on the page; and the average likelihood that participants 
reported they would follow the tips on that page (on a 6-point Likert-type scale). 
Table 10 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for safety practice consumption 
 Viewers 
(%)17 
Time spent (sec) Click count Likelihood of 
following 
Page 1 (3 tips) 70.9 71.79 (55.86) 6.33 (4.79) 4.51 (1.35) 
Page 2 (3 tips) 13.5 51.02 (29.02) 6.05 (4.15) 4.94 (1.20) 
Page 3 (4 tips) 6.9 53.56 (36.54) 7.13 (4.91) 5.26 (0.99) 
Page 4 (4 tips) 8.7 45.48 (42.05) 5.25 (3.32) 5.09 (1.14) 
 Time spent, Click count, and Likelihood of following are displayed as M(SD). 
																																																						
17 This column indicates the percentage of participants who viewed only up until the end 
of that page; for example, 13.5% of participants viewed pages one and two, whereas 
8.7% viewed all four pages. 
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We created two composite variables for likelihood of acting on these safety 
practices, separated by whether the tips concerned online (α = .76; M = 5.00, SD = 1.00) 
or physical safety (α = .83; M = 3.70, SD = 1.60). On the whole, reported likelihoods 
were positively correlated with a mean inter-item correlation of .327 across all online 
tips, and .453 for all physical tips. 
 Situation-specific factors. We operationalized perceived threat probability 
through a single-item measure prompting participants to think of the threat described in 
the article from the beginning of the study. They were then asked to indicate How often 
do you think an event like this occurs? on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from Never 
to All the time. Participants then responded to the three-item threat severity subscale from 
Witte and colleagues’ (1995) RBD Scale (e.g., I believe that the threat described in this 
article is severe), which we combined into a single composite index (α = .88). 
Person-specific factors. To measure perceived susceptibility to the threat, we 
presented participants with the RBD susceptibility subscale (e.g., I am at risk for a threat 
like this; Witte et al., 1995).18 Given the high degree of inter-item agreement for a three-
item scale (α = .87), we created a single composite of perceived susceptibility. We then 
gauged physical size, height, self-defense expertise, security-specific digital literacy, and 
permanent zip code through the same indices described in Study 3. The study concluded 
with a suite of standard demographic items gauging sex, age group, race/ethnicity, annual 
household income, and education. 
																																																						
18 Because Control participants did not read about a threat in their assigned news article, 
we used Display Logic to ensure they did not see threat severity, susceptibility, or 
probability items. 
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All study materials, including all scales, indices, and threat primes, are displayed 
in Appendix C. IRB approval for this study is displayed in Appendix D. Table 11 
displays basic descriptive statistics for all variables of interest, including our person- and 
situation-specific factors. These descriptive statistics are separated by condition in Tables 
12-17 in Appendix E.  
Table 11 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables of interest 
Variable Type Variable Range Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 1-5 2.22 0.92 656 
Perceived online threat 1-5 2.67 0.88 656 
Perceived financial threat 1-5 2.74 1.10 654 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: 
Online 
1-6 5.00 1.00 654 
Safety practice intentionality: 
Physical 
1-6 3.70 1.60 653 
Safety practices pages viewed 1-4 1.53 0.95 654 
Response efficacy (safety 
practices) 
1-6 4.56 0.91 650 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 1-6 4.96 0.76 650 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0-2 0.59 0.73 649 
Victim: Cybercrime 0-2 0.36 0.58 650 
Situation-
specific 
Perceived threat severity 1-6 4.67 0.94 435* 
Perceived threat probability 1-7 4.49 1.35 435* 
Person-specific Perceived threat susceptibility 1-6 3.71 1.13 435* 
Physical size 1-7 4.19 1.30 648 
Height (inches) 56-83 67.19 4.03 645 
Self-defense expertise 1-5 1.82 0.97 648 
Security-related digital literacy 1-5 3.25 0.75 648 
* Smaller sample size reflects that only participants in non-control conditions viewed and 
answered these items 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Tables 18, 19, and 20 display correlation matrices of our key variables of interest. 
Table 18 depicts the relationships between our key dependent variables, including 
perceived safety and intentionality to act on safety practices; Table 19 depicts the 
relationships between our person- and situation-specific factors; and Table 20 depicts the 
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relationships between these two sets of variables (i.e., with our outcome variables as rows 
and exploratory factors as columns). 
Table 18 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables of interest 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .538*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .457*** .482*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent .076† .186*** .089* — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .240*** .234*** .148*** .357*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .132*** .149*** .096** .154*** .376*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .088* .116** -.017 .369*** .388*** .181*** — 
8. Self-efficacy .026 .032 .010 .317*** .317*** .164*** .634*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 649 ≤ n ≤ 656 
 
Table 19 
Study 4: Correlations of person- and situation-specific factors 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .234*** — — — — — — — 
11. Severity -.002 -.001 — — — — — — 
12. Probability .156*** .104* .254*** — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility .116* .120* .219*** .574*** — — — — 
14. Physical size .071† -.002 .054 .153*** .085† — — — 
15. Height .001 -.026 -.097* -.045 -.022 .502*** — — 
16. Self-defense .054 .150*** -.015 .130** .044 .100** .196*** — 
17. Digital literacy .016 .027 -.126** .005 -.003 .085* .138*** .237*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 434 ≤ n ≤ 649 
 
Table 20 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .088* .057 .122* .242*** .271*** .002 -.101** .084* -.038 
2. .052 .102** .237*** .240*** .267*** .049 <.001 .126*** -.127*** 
3. .116*** .106** .140** .225*** .281*** .042 -.040 .044 .034 
4. -.017 -.017 .253*** .122** .061 -.017 -.113** -.059 .023 
5. .009 .064 .179*** .253*** .213*** -.020 -.153*** .149*** .017 
6. .143*** .061 .049 .110* .068 -.001 -.042 .160*** .020 
7.  -.026 .006 .285*** .150** .144*** -.041 -.120** .033 -.018 
8. .038 .010 .290*** .187*** .115* -.023 -.146*** .027 .111** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 435 ≤ n ≤ 650 
 
Tables 21-38—which can be found in Appendix E—depict these correlations in the same 
order, separated by condition. 
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Analyses of variance 
 We first examined whether our manipulations were effective at priming threat in 
their respective domains. We ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVA) in which 
threat domain condition (2-level: physical, online) and threat type condition (3-level: self-
protection, resource, control) were entered as random factors predicting perceived 
physical threat, perceived online threat, and perceived financial threat. There were no 
two-way interactions of threat domain and threat type on perceived physical threat 
(F[2,650] = 1.224, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .004), perceived online threat (F[2,650] = 1.305, p > 
.05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .004), or perceived financial threat (F[2,648] = .002, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ < .001). 
However, we did observe a significant main effect of condition on perceived physical 
safety (F[5,650] = 5.892, p < .001, 𝜂#$ = .043) and perceived online safety (F[5,650] = 
4.047, p = .001, 𝜂#$ = .030), which we probe further in the following section. There was 
no main effect of condition on perceived financial safety, F(5,648) = .186, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ 
= .001. Figures 5, 6, and 7 illustrate mean values of perceived physical, online, and 
financial threat (respectively) across each of our six conditions. Interestingly, these 
graphs—as well as the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 11—suggest that overall, 
participants report feeling less physical threat than online or financial threat, regardless of 
condition. 
Perceived physical threat. Figure 5 illustrates a clear between-group difference 
on perceived physical safety (F[5,650] = 5.892, p < .001, 𝜂#$ = .043) in which overall 
(and as should be expected), participants assigned to our control conditions reported 
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significantly lower perceptions of physical threat, F(1,650) = 26.22, t(650) = 5.12, p < 
.001, 𝜂#$ = .039. 
Figure 5 
Study 4: Mean perceived physical threat scores across conditions 
 
When contrasting participants in any of our physical conditions against those in 
our online conditions, we again see significantly higher perceptions of threat, F(1,650) = 
8.54, t(650) = 2.93, p = .004, 𝜂#$ = .013. However, when we contrasted only physical 
threat conditions against online threat conditions (that is, excluding control conditions 
from analysis), this difference vanished (t[438] = .339, p > .05, ns), possibly suggesting 
that both physical and online threat primes may generalize or “blur” to impact 
perceptions of physical safety. 
 When contrasting participants by type of threat, we found that perceived physical 
threat was significantly higher among self-protection groups (both physical and online) 
compared with all other groups, F(1,650) = 12.282, t(650) = 3.51, p < .001, 𝜂#$ = .019; 
however, this difference vanished when excluding control groups from analysis (t[438] = 
  57 
1.002, p > .05, ns). We found no such distinction among resource threat groups, F(1,650) 
= 2.672, t(650) = 1.64, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .004. 
Perceived online threat. Figure 6 illustrates clear differences between our six 
conditions on perceptions of online threat, F(5,650) = 4.047, p = .001, 𝜂#$ = .030; and 
indeed, participants assigned to our control conditions reported notably lower perceived 
online threat than those in our threat conditions, F(1,650) = 12.836, t(650) = 3.58, p < 
.001, 𝜂#$ = .019. 
Figure 6 
Study 4: Mean perceived online threat scores across conditions 
 
 As we would expect to see, participants reported higher perceptions of online 
threat if they were randomly assigned to one of our online threat conditions compared 
with the remaining four conditions (F[1,650] = 12.53, t(650) = 3.54, p < .001, 𝜂#$ = .019), 
and this difference remained significant when contrasting our online threat groups against 
only our physical threat groups (i.e., excluding control groups from analysis), t(438) = 
1.976, p = .049. 
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Again, and as was the case with perceived physical threat, perceived online threat 
was significantly higher among self-protection groups than our four remaining groups, 
F(1,650) = 4.960, t(650) = 2.22, p = .03, 𝜂#$ = .008; however, when we excluded our 
control groups from analysis, this difference vanished (t[438] = .544, p > .05, ns). There 
were no significant differences when contrasting resource threat groups against other 
conditions, F(1,650) = 1.877, t(650) = 1.37, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .003. 
Perceived financial threat. Figure 7 depicts markedly similar levels of perceived 
financial threat across our six conditions, none of which are significantly different from 
one another (F[5,648] = .186, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .001). No differences emerged when 
contrasting conditions by threat domain (t[437] = -.754, p > .05, ns) or type of threat 
(F[1,648] = .001, t[648] = .03, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ < .001). 
Figure 7 
Study 4: Mean perceived financial threat scores across conditions 
 
 That we found no difference in perceived financial threat among participants 
assigned to our resource threat conditions is noteworthy; logically, these threat primes 
should have yielded increased perceptions of financial threat. However, it is possible that 
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among the demographic of our present sample, the loss of car parts or valuables kept 
inside participants’ cars did not pose as grave a financial threat as we might have 
anticipated; regarding our online resource threat prime, participants may have (possibly 
correctly) expected that if they were to fall victim to bank account fraud through a mobile 
payment app such as Venmo or Paypal—that is, the target of a string of burglaries in our 
news article prime—these apps would reimburse them for their losses, as is customary for 
many financial institutions. 
Taken together, our ANOVA results indicate that our threat manipulations seem 
to have achieved their purpose: Physical threat primes yielded higher perceptions of 
physical threat, and online threat primes led to higher perceptions of online threat. As we 
would expect, participants assigned to control conditions reported the lowest perceived 
threat in either domain. On average, participants in self-protection conditions reported 
higher levels of threat compared with other groups, and there were no between-group 
differences in perceptions of financial threat. Finally, it appears that when participants 
were primed with either physical or online threats, their perceptions of physical threat 
increased to similar levels, suggesting a generalized or blurred effect from even online 
threats to perceptions of physical threats. 
Relationship between physical and online safety 
Actual physical safety. After examining these between-group differences on our 
threat outcome variables, we compared the strength of the relationship between 
perceptions of physical and online safety by condition, which constitutes our fifth and 
sixth hypotheses. Although only an exploratory aim for our fourth study, we first 
examined the relationship between actual physical safety and perceived physical safety, 
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replicating our methods of participant zip code safety coding described in Study 3. 
Because our indices in Study 4 reflect perceived threat, rather than perceived safety, we 
did not reverse-code these safety scores; rather, we left them in their original form as total 
crime, personal crime, and property crime indices (α = .95), creating a final composite of 
actual crime (M = 100.60, SD = 84.83). 
Contrary to Study 3, actual crime was not related to perceived physical threat 
(r[615] = .045, p > .05, ns), online threat (r[615] = .005, p > .05, ns), or financial threat 
(r[615] = -.001, p > .05, ns). When contrasting participants who viewed a threat prime 
against those assigned to a control condition, these correlations remained nonsignificant 
for both groups (physical: z = .128, p > .05, ns; online: z = -.360, p > .05, ns; financial: z 
= 1.058, p > .05, ns). Because Studies 1, 2, and 3 underscore the importance of wealth on 
threat perception and perceived safety, we examined whether income moderated the 
impact of actual physical safety on perceived physical safety, and found a significant 
interaction effect (R2 = .016, F[3,610] = 3.28, p = .02; binteraction = -.0003, p = .043) 
whereby participants (across all six conditions) from low-crime zip codes perceive 
approximately similar levels of physical threat; however, as crime increases, threat 
increases most rapidly among participants from low-income households, possibly 
reflecting a decreased ability to counter or avoid the threat through safety tools (e.g., 
alarm systems) and similar security resources. Alternatively, due to neighborhood 
variation within zip codes, it is likely that low-income households are more cognizant of 
crime if they are located in lower-income, and higher-crime, neighborhoods; wealthy 
households may exist within the same zip code, but in safer communities. As such, these 
wealthier individuals may not perceive physical threat because they are rarely privy to 
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actual crimes in their own immediate surroundings. This interaction effect is depicted in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8 
Study 4: Impact of wealth on the actual-perceived physical safety relationship 
 
 Correlations between actual crime, its constituents, and our key threat variables of 
interest are displayed in Table 39. 
Table 39 
Study 4: Correlations of actual physical crime and perceived threat variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Actual crime — — — — — — — 
2. Total crime .992*** — — — — — — 
3. Personal crime .935*** .893*** — — — — — 
4. Property crime .945*** .957*** .770*** — — — — 
5. Physical threat .045 .049 .064 .025 — — — 
6. Online threat .005 .012 .012 -.001 .538*** — — 
7. Financial threat -.001 -.010 .013 -.010 .457*** .482*** — 
8. Annual income -.098* -.115** -.073† -.106** -.103** -.024 -.118*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 597 ≤ n ≤ 654 
 
Self-protection vs. resource threat. The core research question that Study 4 
sought to answer was whether manipulations of physical threat would predict perceptions 
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of online threat, as well as the reverse, in which manipulations of online threat would 
predict perceived physical threat. We first examined the former of these directional ties 
using Equation 1 from Study 3, in which we regressed (1) perceived physical threat (b1X), 
(2) type of threat (dummy-coded as either [A] self-protection threat or control or [B] 
resource threat or control; b2M), and (3) the interaction of these two predictors (b3XM) on 
our outcome variable (𝑌), perceived online threat. We found no significant interaction 
effect when examining self-protection threat groups against control conditions (β = .037, 
t[652] = 1.109, p > .05, ns); instead, both groups of participants displayed consistently 
positive relationships between physical and online safety. Similarly, no interaction effect 
emerged when only examining participants assigned to a physical threat condition (R2 = 
.237, F[3,319] = 32.993, p < .001; binteraction = -.048, p > .05, ns). 
However, when examining resource threat groups against control conditions, we 
found a significant interaction (β = -.078, t[652] = -2.324, p = .02; R2 = .296, F[3,652] = 
91.551, p < .001) in which participants assigned to resource threat conditions showed a 
much stronger positive relationship between perceived physical and online safety 
compared with control participants (binteraction = -.096, p = .02). Stated differently, among 
those who perceive very little physical threat, resource threat participants perceive less 
online threat than participants who viewed no threat prime at all. Among those who felt 
highly physically threatened, however, control participants reported lower levels of 
online threat than their resource threat counterparts. This means that control participants 
showed less blurring between perceptions of physical and online threat—that is, a lesser 
degree of generalized threat—compared with participants who saw a resource threat 
prime. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 
Study 4: Impact of resource threat vs. control on the physical-online relationship 
 
 We next examined this contrast between threat type in the reverse direction, in 
which perceived online threat predicts perceptions of physical threat. We found a 
significant interaction when contrasting self-protection threat against control group 
participants, β = .081, t(652) = 2.472, p = .014; R2 = .311, F(3,652) = 97.953, p < .001. 
This interaction, which is portrayed in Figure 10 (binteraction = .106, p = .014), depicts a 
stronger positive relationship between perceived online threat and perceived physical 
threat among participants in self-protection conditions, as opposed to control conditions. 
When participants perceive very low levels of online threat, perceptions of physical threat 
remain relatively similar regardless of condition; however, among those who felt highly 
physically threatened, participants who viewed a self-protection threat prime (either 
online or offline) reported significantly higher levels of perceived physical threat. 
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Figure 10 
Study 4: Impact of self-protection threat vs. control on the online-physical relationship 
 
 When contrasting control groups against resource threat groups, however, we 
found no such interaction effect (β = -.020, t[652] = -.601, p > .05, ns); instead, we found 
approximately similar slopes of positive relationships between online and physical safety. 
This remained the case when only examining participants assigned to online threat 
conditions (R2 = .352, F[3,329] = 59.437, p < .001; binteraction = .037, p > .05, ns. We 
found no gender effects when examining self-protection threat primes against control 
conditions (R2 = .291, F[4,639] = 65.653, p < .001; bgender = -.020, p > .05, ns), nor did we 
observe a difference when examining resource threats against control conditions (R2 = 
.296, F[4,639] = 67.040, p < .001; bgender = -.014, p > .05, ns. Stated differently, we found 
consistently positive relationships between physical and online threat among participants 
in self-protection threat conditions (β = .643, t[215] = 12.313, p < .001; R2 = .414, 
F[1,215] = 151.599, p < .001) and resource threat conditions (β = .421, t[221] = 6.899, p 
< .001; R2 = .177, F[1,221] = 47.596, p < .001). 
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To test Hypothesis 5, which explored the possibility that threat type would pose 
differing impacts on the physical-online tie, we examined the strength of the relationships 
between perceived physical (X) and online safety (𝑌) within the individual groups of our 
moderator variable Z, the dummy-coded measure of threat type (self-protection vs. 
resource). To accomplish this, we separated data by group before estimating individual 
regression equations, deemed our simple slopes—quite literally, the magnitude of the 
slopes of each regression line of X on 𝑌. Equations 2 and 3 depict our simple slopes 
equations for self-protection threat participants (Equation 2) and resource threat 
participants (Equation 3). 
 𝑌 = b1,Z=1X + b0,Z=1 (2) 𝑌 = b1,Z=2X + b0,Z=2 (3) 
 Next, we tested the difference between our obtained simple slopes using the 
method elucidated in Robinson, Tomek, and Schumacker (2013), whereby: 
t = %&'(()*+,,-.& (4) 
where bdiff is the difference between out obtained b values stemming from our regression 
equation, and SEpooled—that is, pooled standard error—is equal to: 
SEpooled = 
/0)*012/1)*11/02/13$  (4) 
We computed the significance of our obtained t statistic, or the value indicating the 
degree of difference between both simple slopes, by using a degrees of freedom of (n1 + 
n2 – 2) in our calculations. 
In support of Hypothesis 5, we observed a main effect of threat type on the 
relationship between perceived physical and online safety; namely, this relationship was 
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stronger in self-protection threat conditions than in resource threat conditions (t[438] = 
4.145, p < .001). This difference was also significant when examining the impact of 
perceived online threat on perceived physical threat, t(438) = 3.659, p < .001. 
Physical vs. online threat. When comparing participants assigned to physical and 
online threat manipulations, we again found positive relationships between physical and 
online safety for both groups (physical: β = .447, t[218] = 7.379, p < .001; R2 = .200, 
F[1,218] = 54.455, p < .001; online: β = .623, t[218] = 11.768, p < .001; R2 = .388, 
F[1,218] = 138.475, p < .001). We regressed perceived physical threat, assignment to 
threat domain (dummy-coded to indicate physical or online conditions), and the 
interaction of these two predictors on perceptions of online threat while aggregating 
across threat type. Although there was a significant relationship between physical and 
online safety in both groups, the relationship was not significantly stronger among online 
threat participants as per a simple slope difference analysis (t[654] = .805, p > .05, ns). 
However, when we regressed perceived online threat on perceived physical threat in the 
same fashion, we found a significant difference between these simple slopes; more 
specifically, participants in online threat conditions displayed a significantly stronger 
relationship (that is, more blurring) between perceived online and perceived physical 
threat, t(654) = 3.806, p < .001. 
As such, we found partial support for Hypothesis 6: We observed a main effect of 
threat domain in which participants in online threat conditions showed a stronger positive 
relationship between perceived online safety and perceived physical safety. However, this 
effect vanished when predicting perceived online safety from perceived physical safety. 
This finding suggests that when primed with online threats, perceptions of those online 
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threats will readily, and strongly, generalize to perceptions of physical threats—more so 
than the reverse, in which perceived physical threat guides or informs perceived online 
threat. 
 Comparing relationship strength across conditions. Across all six conditions, we 
observed positive relationships between perceived physical and perceived online threat. 
Figure 11 plots the strength of these six relationships, which are indicated through 
obtained B coefficients for each regression equation. 
Figure 11 
Study 4: Comparing indices of relationship strength across conditions  
 
Each coefficient, which measures the change in our dependent variable with every 
one-unit increase in our predictor variable, reflects the predictive power of the 
manipulated threat type on perceived threat in the opposite domain: For participants 
assigned to a physical threat condition, we regressed physical threat on perceived online 
threat, and performed the reverse regression equation for those assigned to online threat 
conditions. 
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The strength of the relationships observed among participants in self-protection 
(physical: B = .604; online: B = .685) and resource threat conditions (physical: B = .385; 
online: B = .460) very closely approximates our original conjectures—namely, that (1) 
self-protection threats may be more dire to survival and therefore generalize more 
readily; and that (2) online threats may generalize more readily than physical threats 
because they may trickle into the physical world. However, we see a much stronger 
relationship between perceived physical (B = .545) and perceived online safety (B = .473) 
among participants assigned to our control conditions than we might have expected to 
find, considering participants in these conditions were not primed with threat at all. On 
average, these individuals showed a significantly positive relationship between perceived 
physical and online threat (β = .508, t[214] = 8.629, p < .001; R2 = .258, F[1,214] = 
74.465, p < .001), possibly reflecting generalized perceptions of safety between the two 
domains, even in the absence of primed threat: As was the case in Studies 1, 2, and 3, 
there appears to be a tie between perceptions of safety between the two spheres. For 
control participants in this study, who reported consistently lower perceptions of threat, 
we see that those who tend to feel safer in one domain also feel safer in the other. 
Also worthy of note is the difference between physical and online threat domains 
in each threat type condition: Whereas participants in self-protection and resource threat 
conditions displayed a stronger positive relationship between perceived physical and 
online safety if they were assigned to an online threat prime, participants in the online 
control condition showed a weaker relationship between the two. It is possible that when 
people are not primed with overt examples of cybercrime, they do not readily generalize 
perceptions of threat into other domains. As such, it may be that people still require clear 
  69 
examples of threats in the online world to perceive it as dangerous, and to generalize that 
threat into the physical world.    
 Table 40 displays these B coefficients alongside their respective standard errors, 
as well as the conditions from which each condition is significantly different. For 
example, our physical self-protection threat condition is significantly different from the 
obtained slopes for the online control, physical resource threat, and online resource threat 
conditions (|2.443| ≤ t[433] ≤ |4.149|, <.001 ≤ p ≤ .01). 
Table 40 
Study 4: Standardized differences between B coefficients per condition 
 Control Self-Protection Resource 
Physical .545 (.063) a .604 (.049) a, c .385 (.056) b 
Online .473 (.055) a, b .685 (.056) c .460 (.067) a, b 
B coefficients (paired with standard errors) with unmatched subscripts are 
significantly different, p < .05 
 
Downstream safety behaviors 
 After establishing that (1) our manipulations had our intended effect on 
perceptions of threat and (2) physical and online threat are positively related across 
conditions, we sought to examine whether these heightened perceptions of threat 
impacted intentionality to follow recommended safety practices both on- and offline. 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences across our six conditions 
in intentionality to follow safety practices either online (F[5,648] = .811, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = 
.006) or offline (F[5,647] = 1.464, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .011). There was a marginal 
difference in the number of safety tip pages viewed by condition, F[5,648] = 1.864, p = 
.10, 𝜂#$ = .014, marginal. Although we found no two-way interaction on online safety 
practice intentionality (F[2,648] = .956, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .003), we observed a marginal 
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two-way interaction on its physical safety counterpart (F[2,647] = 2.912, p = .055, 𝜂#$ = 
.009, marginal) whereby participants in the resource condition reported relatively 
stagnant likelihoods of following safety practices between physical and online conditions, 
whereas control participants were more likely to follow these physical safety-related tips 
only if they were assigned to the physical control condition. Interestingly, participants in 
self-protection conditions were more likely to follow these tips only if they read the 
online self-protection prime, but not the physical self-protection prime. This indicates 
that participants who read about an online voyeur who had used widely propagated 
malware to hack others’ webcams reported that they were more likely to follow physical 
safety recommendations than those who read about a neighborhood voyeur who posed a 
physical safety threat. This interaction may evince our previously hypothesized fears that 
online threats such as being watched by a webcam hacker may trickle into physical 
threats (e.g., s/he could track me down and hurt me), which may increase intentionality to 
act on physical safety recommendations. Furthermore, individuals who read about a 
neighborhood voyeur may have responded with lower intentionality to act on physical 
safety tips than even control participants due to a sense of removal from the 
neighborhood-specific threat at hand. For one, participants may have considered such an 
event as unlikely in their own neighborhood or living situation (e.g., if they live in a high-
rise apartment safe from prying eyes); for another, participants may have discounted the 
possible bodily harm a voyeur could pose to his or her victims if always separated by a 
windowed wall. As such, physical safety tips may have seemed irrelevant to the 
previously primed threat. This interaction is displayed in Figure 12. 
 
  71 
 Figure 12 
Study 4: Interaction of threat type on physical safety tip intentionality 
 
When contrasting participants in any of the four threat conditions against those in 
control conditions, we found no significant difference in likelihood of following online 
safety practices, F(1,648) = 2.113, t(648) = 1.452, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ = .003; similarly, we 
found no difference in likelihood of following physical safety practices, F(1,647) = .149, 
t(647) = .385, p > .05, ns, 𝜂#$ < .001. However, participants assigned to a threat condition 
were significantly more likely to view more pages of recommended safety practices than 
control participants, F(1,648) = 6.108, t(648) = 2.470, p = .014, 𝜂#$ = .009 (Mdiff = 0.199, 
t[503.83] = 2.684, p = .008).19 
When contrasting physical threat and online threat groups (i.e., excluding control 
groups from analysis), we saw no significant difference in intentionality to follow either 
physical (t[437] = -1.093, p > .05, ns) or online safety tips (t[437] = .459, p > .05, ns), nor 
																																																						
19 Partial df indicates a statistical correction for unequal observed variances in this 
analysis. 
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did we see a difference in the number of safety tip pages viewed (t[437] = .209, p > .05, 
ns). Participants’ self-reported likelihood of following physical safety tip 
recommendations positively predicted the number of tip pages viewed (β = .368, t[650] = 
9.474, p < .001), but likelihood of following online safety recommendations did not (β = 
.023, t[650] = .583, p > .05, ns; R2 = .142, F[2,650] = 53.864, p < .001). 
 We ran a regression model in which perceived physical, online, and financial 
threat predicted likelihood of following online safety tips and found a significant overall 
model (R2 = .036, F[3,650] = 7.995, p < .001); however, only perceived online threat was 
a significant (positive) predictor (β = .202, t[650] = 4.190, p < .001). Perceived physical 
threat and perceived financial threat had no impact on participants’ reported intentionality 
to follow recommended online safety practices. Stated differently, when people felt 
threatened online, they were more interested in protecting themselves from online 
dangers. When we ran the same model predicting physical safety tip intentionality (R2 = 
.073, F[3,649] = 17.029, p < .001), we found that both perceived physical threat and 
perceived online threat positively predicted likelihood of following physical safety tips 
(physical threat: β = .159, t[649] = 3.420, p = .001; online threat: β = .145, t[649] = 
3.076, p = .002). This is noteworthy, and again speaks to the possibility that online 
threats will more readily “bleed into” the physical world: Not only will physical threats 
increase a person’s willingness to protect themselves in the physical world, but online 
threats will yield the same effect. After removing all variance explained by perceptions of 
physical threat, perceived online threat still accounted for a significant amount of 
observed variance, R2change = .016, Fchange(1,672) = 11.560, p = .001. Perceived financial 
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threat had no impact on physical safety tip intentionality (β = .005, t[649] = .116, p > .05, 
ns). 
 Response efficacy and self-efficacy. When examining the impact of response 
efficacy and self-efficacy on likelihood of following these safety practices, we found that 
although both positively predicted intentionality for online safety practices, self-efficacy 
was a stronger predictor (self-efficacy: β = .320, t[647] = 7.019, p < .001; response 
efficacy: β = .166, t[647] = 3.650, p < .001; R2 = .197, F[2,647] = 79.404, p < .001). This 
was not the case with physical safety practice intentionality, for which response efficacy 
(β = .312, t[646] = 6.687, p < .001) was a stronger predictor than self-efficacy (β = .120, 
t[646] = 2.564, p = .011; R2 = .159, F[2,646] = 61.010, p < .001). 
The importance of self-efficacy in defending oneself against digital security 
threats is clear: digital literacy and other learned abilities are paramount in detecting, and 
protecting oneself from, cybercrime. But it is possible that self-efficacy is considered less 
relevant to following recommended physical safety practices for those who feel that their 
ability to counter physical attacks is out of their control, particularly if they do not feel 
that they are biologically equipped to avoid or address the threat. Stated differently, 
physical size, height, and even self-defense expertise may be considered important 
factors in self-efficacy when considering physical threats, but should be less relevant to 
online threats. Indeed, although physical size (β = .025, t[639] = .618, p > .05, ns), height 
(β = -.047, t[639] = -1.135, p > .05, ns), and self-defense expertise (β = -.057, t[639] = -
1.577, p > .05, ns) were nonsignificant predictors of intentionality to follow online safety 
practices, both height (β = -.167, t[638] = -3.955, p < .001) and self-defense expertise (β 
= .165, t[638] = 4.545, p < .001) were significant predictors of physical safety practice 
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intentionality, and physical size was a trending predictor (β = .063, t[638] = 1.536, p = 
.125, trending). 
Interestingly, men were less likely to consider following both online (t[642] = 
4.279, p < .001) and physical safety tips (t[594.376] = 5.417, p < .001), possibly because 
they feel less need to invest in their physical safety in day-to-day life; although men 
experience more physical violence than women, women report higher fears for their 
safety, and tend to perceive threat more readily than their male counterparts (Bailey, 
Caffrey, & Hartnett, 1976; Sell et al., 2009).20 Finally, digital literacy—which we might 
suppose could also serve as a form of self-efficacy in defending oneself against threat—
had no impact on either online (β = .023, t[646] = .582, p > .05, ns) or physical safety 
practice intentionality (β = .017, t[645] = .422, p > .05, ns). 
Personal and situational factors 
 Our final exploratory aim for this fourth and final study was to examine whether, 
as was the case with Hypothesis 4 in Study 3, certain personal and situational factors 
moderate the physical-online relationship. 
 Situation-specific factors. One of our key situation-specific factors of interest 
was the type of threat (i.e., self-protection threat vs. resource threat), which we 
experimentally manipulated in Study 4. As we have reported, participants primed with 
resource threats displayed a stronger blurring or generalizing effect between the physical 
and the digital than did control participants; we did not, however, see the same pattern 
																																																						
20 Although it appears that taller individuals report lower intentionality to follow online 
(r[643] = -.113, p = .004) or physical safety recommendations (r[642] = -.153, p < .001), 
this finding is confounded by gender; when holding gender constant, these relationships 
vanish (online: r[638] = .008, p > .05, ns; physical: r[638] = -.014, p > .05, ns).  
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among those assigned to self-protection threat conditions. Of our remaining situational 
factors—namely, perceived threat probability and perceived threat severity—only 
perceived threat probability played a role in the relationship between perceived physical 
safety and perceived online safety (R2 = .312, F[3,431] = 65.090, p < .001). 
Figure 13 
Study 4: Impact of threat probability on the online-physical relationship 
 
 This interaction effect, which is displayed in Figure 13, illustrates a trend in 
which the relationship between perceived online threat and perceived physical threat is 
highest among those who perceive the threat prime at hand to be highly probable 
(binteraction = .077, t[431] = 2.435, p = .015). This speaks to an assumption that for those 
who consider a threat to be highly probable to occur in their lives, the need to generalize 
a sense of threat from one domain—here, online safety—to the other (namely, physical 
safety) is paramount. This moderation effect did not exist in the reverse, in which 
perceived physical threat predicted perceived online threat (binteraction = .018, t[431] = 
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.681, p > .05, ns). Perceived threat severity did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between perceived physical and online threat, binteraction = .041, t(431) = .873, p > .05, ns. 
Person-specific factors. Of our person-specific factors, perceived threat 
susceptibility (binteraction = .021, t[431] = .608, p > .05, ns),21 past victimization 
experiences with cybercrime (binteraction = -.082, t[646] = -1.348, p > .05, ns), physical size 
(binteraction = -.024, t[644] = -.916, p > .05, ns), self-defense expertise (binteraction = .035, 
t[644] = 1.063, p > .05, ns), and digital literacy (binteraction = -.060, t[644] = -1.382, p > 
.05, ns) did not play a role on the relationship between perceived physical and perceived 
online safety. Instead, only past victimization experiences with physical crime, as well as 
participants’ height, significantly moderated this relationship. 
More specifically, and as is depicted in Figure 14, we observed that participants 
who had never been a victim of physical crime showed the strongest positive relationship 
between perceived physical and perceived online threat (R2 = .302, F[3,645] = 92.949, p 
< .001; binteraction = -.147, t[645] = -3.528, p < .001). This finding opposes the moderation 
effect found in Study 3, in which the reverse held true: Victims of physical crime showed 
the strongest relationship between perceived physical and online safety, whereas non-
victims displayed a positive, but weaker, relationship. 
 
 
 
																																																						
21 Because past victimization experiences were originally captured as an index of 
perceived susceptibility following the EPPM, we examined whether these measures were 
indeed correlated. We observed a positive relationship between perceived susceptibility 
and past victimization experiences with physical crime (r[446] = .122, p = .01) and 
cybercrime (r[447] = .125, p = .008). 
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Figure 14 
Study 4: Impact of physical crime victimization on the physical-online relationship 
 
 Stated differently, our Study 4 findings point to a trend whereby victims of past 
physical crimes perceive the lowest online threat when they perceive that they are in 
highly threatening physical situations (bhigh = .413, p < .001). However, those who find 
themselves in safer physical conditions perceive higher levels of online threat. It is 
possible that victims of past physical crimes who maintain a higher sense of physical 
threat view the online world as a refuge or escape, or create a mental separation between 
the two worlds to establish a sense of safety in at least one domain in which they have not 
been victimized. We will discuss this possibility in more depth in the general discussion 
section. 
 We also found a marginal moderation effect of height on the online-physical 
relationship, in which taller participants displayed a weaker positive relationship between 
perceived online threat and perceived physical threat (R2 = .301, F[3,641] = 92.164, p < 
.001; binteraction = -.015, t[641] = -1.788, p = .074, marginal). Just as it may be more dire 
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for high-probability threats to generalize between the two domains (i.e., to act upon these 
threats, regardless of where they might appear), it is possible that participants of a shorter 
height feel less able to defend themselves against threats, and therefore more readily 
generalize or blur their perceptions of threat between domains. This interaction effect, 
which is illustrated in Figure 15, grows even more significant when controlling for 
gender in the same model (binteraction = -.016, t[637] = -1.852, p = .064, marginal; R2change 
= .015, Fchange[1,640] = 9.984, p = .002). 
Figure 15 
Study 4: Impact of height on the online-physical relationship 
 
 Lastly, we observed a gender effect on perceptions of physical threat whereby 
female participants perceived higher threat than their male counterparts, regardless of 
assigned condition, t(642) = -3.119, p = .002. When pairing gender and height as 
predictors of perceived physical threat (R2 = .023, F[3,660] = 5.071, p = .002; binteraction = 
.057, p = .022), we found that women reported higher perceptions of physical threat than 
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their male counterparts, regardless of height (bfemale = .021, t[660] = 1.227, p > .05, ns); 
among male participants, taller men reported lower perceptions of physical safety than 
their shorter counterparts (bmale = -.036, t[660] = -2.019, p = .04). There were no 
differences between male and female participants on perceived online threat (t[642] = -
.1434, p > .05, ns) or perceived financial threat (t[642] = -1.178, p > .05, ns). 
In summary, we found partial support for Hypothesis 4, in which several person- 
(i.e., physical victimization experiences, height) and situation-specific factors (i.e., threat 
probability) moderated the relationship between perceptions of safety in the physical and 
online worlds. 
 Summary of findings. Taken together, findings from Study 4 evince a 
generalization effect in which manipulations of threat in one domain “blur” into 
perceived threat in the opposite domain. We again establish a positive relationship 
between perceptions of physical and online safety regardless of randomly assigned 
condition, replicating our key findings from Studies 1, 2, and 3. It appears that online 
threats blur more readily into physical domains, possibly speaking to the concern that 
online dangers (such as webcam hackers and bank account fraud) will trickle into the 
physical world. Similarly, online threat primes are even more effective at increasing the 
likelihood of following recommended safety practices in the physical world than are 
physical threat primes, possibly speaking to the concern that the ramifications of online 
dangers (such as webcam hacking) will trickle into the physical world. And finally, the 
generalization between perceptions of physical threat into perceptions of online threat 
was stronger after being exposed to a self-protection threat prime compared with a 
resource threat prime, possibly underscoring the more dire nature of threats to bodily 
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safety than those to valuable resources. Although resource threats could certainly pose 
danger to survival (i.e., due to a lack of monetary resources to afford food and shelter), 
self-protection threats should—by their very nature—pose a threat that is more direct and 
therefore more costly. As such, it is possible that self-protection threats encourage the 
generalization of perceived danger between domains to better prepare the target to act on, 
or avoid, the threats at hand. 
This distinction between type of threat should be replicated in additional research, 
and potential moderators should be more closely examined. First, although self-protection 
threats and resource threats comprise our operationalization of crime, safety, and threat 
across all four studies in the present research, there are many forms of threat in the 
physical and online worlds; threats to information loss and reputation damage are two 
examples that may interact with threat domain (physical or online). Second, decades 
worth of FBI data defends the gendered nature of physical crime: perpetrators are more 
likely to be male, and—with the exception of violent crime—victims of assault and 
robbery are more likely to be female (FBI, 2016; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). As such, 
women often perceive higher self-protection threat both on- and offline (Donnelly, 1989; 
Toseland, 1982). Furthermore, a wealth of evolutionary psychological research indicates 
that males place heavy emphasis on status to improve mating opportunities (Li & 
Kenrick, 2006; Li et al., 2013), which may increase males’ sensitivity to resource threats 
compared with female participants. Future research may wish to introduce a mating 
prime to this study design with the intention of exploring whether mating motives 
underlie gender differences in the impact of status-threatening resource threat on 
perceptions of physical and online threat. 
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Finally, and as we will discuss in depth in our final discussion, our sample—
although not solely comprised of college students—remained relatively homogeneous 
compared with the general population in the U.S. Given the high percentage of White, 
working class participants, we might expect differences in perceptions of safety given 
fundamental differences in lifestyle, location, and day-to-day experiences in the physical 
world. We might also expect that individuals earning money through an online survey-
taking platform may be higher in digital literacy than the average U.S. citizen; indeed, 
even compared with predominately White, middle- and upper-class college students from 
Study 3, we observe a significant increase in self-reported digital literacy between the 
two samples, t(1907) = 2.06, p = .04. Future research should seek to replicate these 
findings with a more diverse sample in ethnicity, age, and socioeconomic status. 
General Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
 Studies 1 and 2. Across four studies, we found a positive relationship between 
physical and online safety in macro-level actuality and in individual-level perception. At 
the national level, objective indices of physical safety were positively related to objective 
measures of online safety, even when holding the confounding effects of wealth constant. 
We replicated these findings at the state level using measures of personal (violent crime) 
and resource crime (property crime, bank robberies) while controlling for state-level 
wealth. 
 Study 3. Among individuals, actual safety—as measured by zip code crime 
data—was a positive reflection of perceptions of physical safety; these perceptions, in 
turn, mapped onto perceived online safety, even when holding annual household income 
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constant. We examined whether certain person-specific factors related to threat 
perception altered the strength of this positive tie between the physical and the digital, 
and found that past victimization of physical crime, computer security-related digital 
literacy, and actual physical safety from personal crime were significant moderators. 
More specifically, past victims of burglary, robbery, and similar physical crimes 
who also perceived that they lived in highly unsafe physical environments also reported 
significantly lower perceptions of online safety compared with non-victims. As such, past 
victims displayed a higher degree of “blurring” between the online and the offline, 
possibly as a way to generalize perceived threat into any potentially related domain in 
case of attack. Individuals who perceived that they lived in physically safe environments 
reported significantly higher perceptions of online safety if they felt that they were 
digitally literate in areas of computer security (e.g., protecting their machines from 
viruses). This indicates that we observed the highest degree of blurring among those high 
in digital literacy—that is, those who would be best equipped to handle perceived threats 
in the online world. Just as threat appears to generalize between domains among past 
victims, perceived safety seems to generalize among those who feel particularly safe in a 
given domain; the moderation models of these two interactions are opposites (see Figures 
2 and 3), in that past victimization differed among threatened individuals, and digital 
literacy differed among individuals who feel particularly safe. Finally, participants who 
lived in unsafe areas—specifically, zip codes high in assault, murder, and robbery—
displayed our predicted positive relationship between perceived physical and online 
safety, whereas those in safe zip codes displayed no change in perceived online safety 
across two standard deviations of variation in perceived physical safety. This interaction 
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effect fits closely with our findings from past victims, in which generalization of 
perceived threats may be more dire for those who expect to be threatened in the physical 
world. 
 Study 4. In our final study, a series of ANOVA suggested that our experimental 
manipulations of threat seem to have achieved their purpose: Physical threat primes 
yielded higher perceptions of physical threat, and online threat primes led to higher 
perceptions of online threat. As we would expect, participants assigned to control 
conditions reported the lowest perceived threat in physical and online domains. Although 
we did not find a direct impact of resource threat primes on perceived financial threat, it 
is possible that neither resource threat prime—namely, a series of car break-ins and 
fraudulent bank account transactions—instilled the same degree of threat that we might 
have expected. Participants in our online resource threat condition may have expected the 
companies implicated in these fraudulent transactions (e.g., Venmo, Paypal) to reimburse 
them for their losses; similarly, although we chose to prime car break-ins rather than 
house burglaries to remove any bodily harm component from the article, individuals in 
our sample may not have kept valuable items in their cars, and may have had 
comprehensive insurance to cover theft of car parts. On average, participants in self-
protection conditions reported higher levels of threat, possibly underscoring the more dire 
nature of threats to bodily safety than those to valuable resources. Interestingly, it appears 
that when participants were primed with either physical or online threats, their 
perceptions of physical threat increased to similar levels, suggesting a generalized or 
blurred effect from online threats to perceptions of physical threats. 
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 Actual and perceived physical safety. Contrary to findings from Study 3, we 
observed no direct relationship between actual physical safety and perceived physical 
safety; however, because our third study comprised a geographically homogeneous 
sample from the same university, we examined whether increased heterogeneity of 
geographic location might also entail increased variation in wealth. Indeed, annual 
household income significantly moderated the relationship between actual and perceived 
physical safety, such that low-income households may be more cognizant of crime if they 
are located in lower-income—and higher-crime—neighborhoods. Even if wealthy 
households exist within the same zip code, they may live in safer communities where 
actual crime is not apparent and cannot guide or inform perceptions of physical danger. 
 Threat domain and type of threat. We predicted that type of threat (self-protection 
vs. resource) and threat domain (physical vs. online) would play a role in the positive 
relationship between perceived physical and perceived online safety. First, we found that 
this relationship was stronger in self-protection threat conditions than in resource threat 
conditions, possibly because self-protection threats may be seen to pose a more direct 
threat to bodily safety than threats to valuable or monetary resources. Second, we found 
that although the physical-online relationship was consistently positive (i.e., not 
significantly different) between both physical and online threat conditions, this was not 
the case when regressing perceived online safety on perceived physical safety: Instead, 
we observed a significantly stronger relationship among participants in online threat 
conditions. This finding suggests that when online dangers are made salient, perceptions 
of those online threats will readily, and strongly, generalize to perceptions of physical 
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threats, possibly speaking to the concern that online dangers will trickle into the physical 
world. 
  Downstream safety behaviors. Contrary to expectations, we found no significant 
differences between our six conditions in self-reported intention to follow physical or 
online safety practices; however, participants assigned to any of our four threat 
conditions were more likely to read more pages of safety practice recommendations than 
control participants. Again supporting the possibility that online threats may generalize 
more readily to physical domains, we found that participants who read about an online 
webcam hacker voyeur were more likely than participants who read about an in-person 
neighborhood voyeur to act upon physical safety recommendations, possibly out of the 
fear that a webcam hacker could track down victims in the physical world. 
 Although we found no impact of threat prime on safety practice intentionality, we 
did observe that perceived online threat positively predicted likelihood of following 
online safety tips. Interestingly, perceived online threat and perceived physical threat 
jointly predicted likelihood of following physical safety tips, again offering credence to 
our hypothesis that online threats will bleed more readily into the physical world. 
Furthermore, perceived online threat remained a significant predictor even after removing 
from the regression equation all variance explained by perceived physical threat. 
 We may have found no between-group differences in safety practice intentionality 
due to demand characteristics, in which participants form predictions about the 
experiment’s purpose and alter their responses to fit those interpretations. Even 
participants in control conditions may have formed the opinion that, after responding to 
batteries of perceived threat scales, they were meant to respond to safety practice 
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recommendations in a certain way. If this is the case, future research may wish to 
investigate the impact of type of threat and threat domain on safety tip intentionality with 
distractor scales between manipulations, threat indices, and safety tips to mislead 
participants’ interpretations about the experiment. Alternatively, future research may 
wish to employ a two-part study whereby participants receive a follow-up survey several 
days after encountering the threat prime and answering related threat scales, allowing for 
enough time for participants to read recommended safety practices without feeling 
pressured to respond a particular way. Finally, our sample comprised Turkers, who are 
compensated on a study-by-study basis; time spent completing one study could be spent 
earning more money on a following opportunity, which encourages Turkers to finish each 
study as quickly as possible. Because almost three-quarters of participants skipped ahead 
after viewing	only one page of recommended safety tips, we might guess that participants 
chose to rush through this optional section, making at least one of our dependent 
variables (i.e., number of tip pages viewed) less indicative of actual likelihood of acting 
on these recommendations. 
 Personal and situational factors. As was the case in Study 3, we found that 
several person- and situation-specific factors related to threat perception moderated the 
positive relationship between perceived physical and online safety. We observed a more 
positive relationship—possibly indicating more blurring between the physical and the 
digital—when participants perceived that the threat to which they were exposed was 
more probable to occur in their lives. As was the case with past victimization and actual 
personal safety in Study 3, this interaction effect may speak to the more dire need for 
highly probable threats to generalize readily into any potentially relevant domain, 
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regardless of the domain in which that threat first appeared (i.e., when collapsing across 
physical and online conditions). Similarly, we found that shorter participants displayed a 
stronger relationship between perceived online threat and perceived physical threat, again 
speaking to the possibility that individuals who feel more defenseless against physical 
crimes should more readily generalize senses of threat across domains. The directionality 
of this particular interaction—namely, that perceived online threat predicts perceived 
physical threat—is noteworthy: Shorter participants who might consider a webcam 
hacker a direct and physical threat to bodily safety (e.g., he or she will track me down) 
seemed more likely to generalize that threat to the physical world than their taller 
counterparts, regardless of gender. More broadly, female participants perceived higher 
physical threat than their male counterparts, even when taking height into consideration; 
perceived online and financial threat, on the other hand, did not differ by gender. 
 Contrary to findings from Study 3, we found that past victims of physical crime 
displayed a weaker relationship between perceived physical and online threat than non-
victims. Following our original hypotheses, we might have expected past victims to show 
stronger generalizations from the physical to the digital when made to feel threatened; but 
instead, we found that when in a physically safe environment, past victims feel much 
more threatened online than do non-victims. When highly threatened offline, however, 
their sense of online safety remains relatively higher than their non-victim counterparts. It 
is possible that victims who maintain a higher sense of physical threat may view the 
online world as refuge or an escape; without a sense of physical safety as a buffer from 
fear of future victimization, these individuals may create a mental separation between the 
two worlds to establish a false perception of safety in at least one domain in which they 
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have not been victimized. If this were the case, it would be possible that past victims are 
engaging in motivated cognition to accomplish a self-deceiving end goal: Those who fear 
unsafe environments based on their past experiences are motivated to construe their 
surroundings in a safer light, even if such construals are deceptive (Balcetis, 2008; 
Dunning, 2015). Without further context surrounding this particular analysis, we are left 
with only this conjecture, which future research may wish to explore more deeply. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As has been discussed, our samples from Studies 3 and 4 comprised relatively 
homogeneous groups within the U.S. Study 3 investigated correlational ties between 
actual and perceived physical safety and perceived online safety among a predominately 
White, upper-middle-class group of college students living in a safe, university-
dominated city. Although more geographically diverse, Study 4 examined the causal 
effects of threat on perceived safety among a majority young, White, working-class 
sample that earned money on a digitally mediated platform. We must therefore bring into 
question the external validity of our samples on the individual level, and along two key 
spectrums: First, it remains to be investigated whether older generations demonstrate the 
same spillover effect from perceived online threats into perceived threats in day-to-day 
life, particularly considering differences in amounts of time spent online and levels of 
comfort with cyberspace (Thomas, 2011). Second, and beyond the U.S., we must also 
question whether our findings generalize to societies with lower infrastructure for 
technology; if the cornerstone of our empirical investigation regards the blurring or 
overlap between the physical and the digital, this argument may break down in countries 
where most households lack computer access; where online banking is not only rare, but 
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impossible; or where online identities are only half-formed for purposes of amusement, 
rather than necessity. 
 In the present research, we investigated two types of threat commonly 
encountered in modern-day life: threats to self-protection and threats to valuable or 
monetary resources. However, we know that not only are there other forms of dangers—
say, to reputation or social belonging—but that the range of self-protection and resource 
threats extends far beyond the manipulations presented in our fourth study. Unlike 
cyberstalking or overt threats of bodily harm communicated through online channels, we 
chose to prime a form of online self-protection threat that is not directly connected to the 
physical world—namely, being watched through a webcam, just as someone may be 
watched by a voyeur outside his or her window. But even without this logical connection 
to physical safety, it is possible that our participants felt just as unsettled by the idea of an 
online perpetrator whose geographic location remained unknown: The ubiquitous nature 
of this threat may have underscored the sensation that there are no metaphorical doors to 
lock against a threat with unknown origins. As such, it remains unclear whether all online 
threats generalize equally readily to the physical world as did those primed in the present 
research. Future work may wish to explore a wider array of such threats to examine 
differential impacts on the generalization of threat perception between domains. 
 Although our individual-level indices of threat and person- and situation-specific 
factors demonstrated high reliability and validity in past research, we must note that our 
measure of digital literacy was subjective in nature, and therefore not an objective 
illustration of participants’ actual ability to defend themselves from online threats. 
Research suggests that millennials, who comprise a majority of our samples for Studies 3 
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and 4, believe themselves to be higher in digital literacy than they actually are 
(Considine, Horton, & Moorman, 2009); in fact, their digital literacy skills are scarcely 
higher than those of the generation before them—it is only their comfort with technology 
that has increased.22 As such, it remains to be seen whether actual computer security 
skills play a role in this generalization of threat between domains. 
 Although we have examined the causal nature of the tie between manipulated 
threat and perceived safety, we know little of the impact of time on this relationship. A 
two-part study examining lingering perceptions of threat and safety tip intentionality 
days—or even weeks—after prime exposure would add to our understanding of the 
longevity of these effects. Given the ubiquity of online threats such as data breaches (e.g., 
one third of Americans were victims of healthcare data breaches in 2015 alone; Bitglass, 
2016), a large-scale longitudinal study could capture ongoing perceptions of physical and 
online safety and how they relate to crime-related events in mainstream news and 
participants’ immediate communities. This same study could then serve as a time-series 
analysis after (a portion of) participants personally experience a physical crime- or 
cybercrime-related event: How does the onset of this event impact perceptions of threat, 
and in which domains? Does safety tip intentionality increase over time when perceptions 
of threats continue to linger? Is the longevity of these perceptions partially dependent on 
personality factors (e.g., neurotic individuals may perceive threats for a comparably 
																																																						
22 Supporting this finding, a recent Pew Internet study found that only 10% of American 
Internet users recognize two-factor authentication, a leading security measure, when they 
see it—a number far lower than our observed estimates of self-reported digital literacy 
surrounding security methods (Collins, 2017). 
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longer period of time due to a heightened tendency to ruminate over negative events; 
McCullough et al., 2001)? 
 And finally, a core assumption underlying our theoretical argument is that we 
have observed this generalization between the physical and the digital due to 
unprecedented levels of interaction with the digital world. We surmise that as human 
“screen time” continues to increase, the blurring between threats in either domain will 
grow even stronger to protect oneself in any related domain. The digital world has 
become an added layer of existence that is growing increasingly integrated into our day-
to-day, and previously unconnected, lives; as such, we might expect that people who 
spend more time online show stronger blurring effects, or a more positive relationship 
between perceptions of physical and online safety. To investigate this possibility, future 
research would need to sample from a wider array of human users; we might expect that 
college students and young Turkers show inordinately high levels of digital engagement 
compared with older generations, individuals from rural communities, or citizens of 
countries lacking in cyberinfrastructure. 
This research is the first to our knowledge to expand our social psychological 
understanding of the relationship between physical safety and online safety in this highly 
digitally connected world; however, many questions remain to be answered to provide a 
more comprehensive illustration of this relationship across more heterogeneous samples 
and cultures, as it relates to objective measures of factors related to threat perception, 
over time following the onset of a real-life threat, and as it applies to time spent in the 
online world. 
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Contributions and Implications 
 Taken together, these four studies established (1) a connection between objective 
measures of physical and online safety on the level of nation and state; (2) the 
relationship between community safety and perceptions of physical safety on the 
individual level; and (3) the nature of this tie on the level of individual perception, both at 
any point in time and as a result of experimental manipulation. In addition, we 
established (4) the roles that personal and situational factors relevant to threat perception 
play in this relationship, and (5) the impact of threat perception on downstream safety 
practices. 
Downstream safety behaviors. Regarding this fifth and more applied 
contribution, we found that perceptions of physical and online threat positively predict a 
person’s intentionality to learn more about, and act upon, online safety practices. These 
findings were not dependent upon randomly assigned threat condition, but rather on self-
reported perceptions of threat following prime exposure. Interestingly, when people feel 
threatened in the online world, they report higher intentionality to follow recommended 
safety practices both online and offline, again hinting at heightened blurring from the 
digital to the physical. As such, organizations such as IC3 may consider immediately 
following up on reported cyberattacks with suggested safety practices to increase 
attention to, and proactive steps toward, securing a safer cyberspace; in addition, this 
government-supported site may serve as an optimal platform for communicating ways to 
stay safe offline following cybercrime incidents with a possibly physical component (e.g., 
cyberstalking). 
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Furthermore, we observed that participants who live in dangerous zip codes 
(Study 3)—or, alternatively, low-income households in dangerous zip codes (Study 4)—
perceive higher levels of physical threat, and that these perceptions positively inform 
perceived online threat. E-mail clients and social networking sites with access to users’ 
physical locations should consider new segmentation strategies to increase awareness—
and use—of settings that will increase account security. If a user’s zip code is associated 
with physical threat, and because these findings suggest that these threats generalize into 
the online domain, we might expect users to want to proactively avoid those threats in 
cyberspace, making them more likely to seek out—and act upon—customized safety 
controls on their account. As such, users from particular physical settings may benefit 
from a tailored security experience while online, including uniquely sorted lists of 
proffered security controls, walkthroughs of new safety measures, and periodic “check-
ups” of the security of users’ accounts. 
The digital informs the physical. Most notably, the present research has 
established that perceptions of online threat generalize more strongly into perceived 
threat in the physical world than is the reverse, in which physical threat informs 
perceived online safety. First, when participants were primed with either physical or 
online threats, their perceptions of physical threat increased to similar—that is, not 
statistically different—levels. Second, we observed a significantly stronger relationship 
between perceived online threat and perceived physical threat among participants in 
online threat conditions. Third, participants who read about an online webcam hacker 
voyeur were more likely than participants who read about a physical, neighborhood 
voyeur to act upon physical safety recommendations; and fourth, even after removing all 
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variance explained by perceived physical threat, perceptions of online threat significantly 
predicted physical safety tip intentionality. 
This finding is noteworthy because, taken together, this research establishes a 
connection between the physical and the digital in an era of unprecedented engagement 
with the online world. Every day, the average American adult spends more time gazing at 
a screen into an intangible world than they do interacting with the physical milieu around 
them (Nielsen, 2016). It would be imprudent to assume that our basic human instincts 
cannot, and should not, change to meet the new environments in which we find ourselves: 
Our sense of safety and security that has historically stemmed from the creation of 
barriers between self and danger must now incorporate new methods of self-protection 
against still-evolving threats that can occur anywhere, at any time. Although we have 
demonstrated that—even beyond the confounding effects of wealth—societies that are 
physically safe also tend to be safe in the online world (i.e., implying a relationship from 
the physical to the digital), our findings suggest that among individual-level perceptions, 
it is the online that informs the offline—the digital that guides the physical. 
These fears of an unknown, unseen threat in cyberspace appear to permeate our 
sense of security in day-to-day life, leading to a blurring effect between perceived threats 
in the online and offline worlds. But most importantly, it would seem that we—as human 
users—are quite aware of the potential for online threats to pose downstream physical 
consequences to bodily or resource-related safety; furthermore, this awareness is only 
heightened among individuals who may perceive chronically higher levels of threat due 
to personal and situational factors such as community safety, physical size, past 
victimization experiences, ability to defend oneself online, and the probability that the 
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threat will occur at all. In the absence of a metaphorical lock and key, this generalization 
of threat between domains may function as a strategy to prepare oneself for future 
dangers wherever they might appear; and indeed, perceived threat in either world appears 
to positively influence a person’s drive to act on recommended safety practices. 
Decades of past research in cyberpsychology and human-computer interaction has 
supported a strong distinction between the online and offline worlds in self-presentation, 
interpersonal perception, and control over the time and pace of interaction with external 
stimuli (Bodford, in press; Bodford & Kwan, in press; McKenna & Bargh, 2000). As 
such, human attitudes and behaviors have been shown to differ substantially between the 
two spheres. In the offline world, we are bound to physical forms and geographic 
situations that remain relatively stagnant. But online, we can assume whatever identities 
we wish without consideration of temporal or spatial bounds; to adopt two entirely 
separate personas is not only possible, but easy. As such, empirical work has 
conceptualized cyberspace as a separate dimension—a layer of interaction that can be 
added to the physical world, but that can just as easily be removed from it. 
However, the present work suggests that these two worlds are not as distinct as 
past literature—and indeed, popular culture—would have us believe: Instead, it appears 
that our perceptions of the world around us are shared between domains, and that when 
made to feel frightened, our psychological processes bleed from one world to the other. 
Across four studies, we observed consistently positive ties between safety in the physical 
and online worlds across countries (|r[155]| = .308, p < .001) and U.S. states (r[48] = 
.395, p = .005) after controlling for the confounding effects of wealth to afford reliable 
infrastructures for societal safety. We observed a smaller correlation (r[1249] = .130, p < 
  96 
.001) when gauging this correlational tie on the level of individual perceptions, signaling 
that even when measured in the absence of manipulation, psychological processes are not 
independent between the two domains. But most notably, the dividing line between these 
perceptions becomes least rigid—that is, most blurred—in the face of threat (r[654] = 
.538, p < .001), pointing to a collapsing of the boundary between the physical and digital 
when threat is made salient through experimental manipulation. Stated differently, when 
we are made to feel afraid, these two worlds seem to collapse even further. 
In social domains where self-presentation, interpersonal perception, and mediated 
communication are concerned, it is certainly possible that we take for granted the 
physically removed nature of the digital world, seeking ways to hide in the shadows of 
this new medium. But in the domain of fear, our work seems to point to a feeling that 
there is nowhere to hide—that a threat in one world will bleed into the other. These 
findings beg the question of the exact nature of the consequences of this perceived 
collapsing between the two worlds. If this generalization of threat is an adaptive strategy, 
one might hope to see an increase in online safety precautions, wariness of novel sites or 
contacts, and withholding of personal information from unknown entities; whether this is 
indeed the case, however, is another matter entirely. It also remains to be seen if a 
person’s extent of online engagement—the time spent in cyberspace, the resources 
invested in an intangible world—heightens this generalization of threat, and to what end. 
As younger generations invest more time and energy into a space accompanied by 
unknown and ever-advancing dangers, we must work to champion awareness of 
cybercrime and safety practices while emphasizing the blurred boundaries between the 
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online and the offline. On this note, we close with a quote from Lucas’s (2015, pp. xxi-
xxiii) Cyberphobia: 
Our sense of security in the wider world outside our homes 
and workplaces is instinctive. We know that some 
neighborhoods are safer than others, that some times of day 
require special precautions. Like many generations before 
us, our security in real life depends on locks and keys. 
Once we venture online, all that vanishes. Our real-world 
senses are constrained. It is a simulacrum of the real world, 
but a deceptive one. 
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The questions below ask about the neighborhood where your permanent home is located. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. 
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In the neighborhood where I live, people really do not 
need to lock their doors when they leave their homes 
for a short period of time. 
       
People who live in my neighborhood have to worry 
about someone breaking into their home to steal things. 
       
People in my neighborhood can walk around at night 
without fear of being attacked or bothered by strangers. 
       
People in my neighborhood can leave their personal 
property outside and unattended without fearing that it 
will be damaged or stolen. 
       
 
Is there any area within two blocks of your home where you would be worried about 
walking alone at night? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
If there any area within two blocks of your home where you would be worried about 
walking at night, even if someone else were with you? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Have you or a household member ever been a victim of theft or burglary (either when 
you were at home or away from home)? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Have you or a household member ever been a victim of assault/battery, robbery, or 
murder? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Have you or a household member ever been the victim of identity theft? 
m Yes 
m No 
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Have you or a household member ever been the victim of cyberbullying or 
cyberstalking? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Which of the following websites do you use or visit at least once a month? (Select all that 
apply.) 
q Facebook 
q Google+ 
q Instagram 
q LinkedIn 
q Snapchat 
 
Thinking only of the websites you indicated above, please indicate how much you agree 
or disagree with each of the following statements. 
 
If you only used one of the above websites, please answer these questions with only that 
website in mind. 
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These websites have enough security measures to 
protect my personal information. 
       
When I post information on these websites, I am sure 
that it will not be intercepted or obtained by 
unauthorized third parties. 
       
I am confident that the private information I provide 
these websites will be secured. 
       
I think these websites are very concerned about the 
security of any transactions. 
       
I feel secure using these websites.        
I feel safe when I provide personal information to these 
websites. 
       
 
In terms of your Internet skills (e.g., changing privacy or security settings in your 
browser), do you consider yourself to be... 
m Not at all skilled 
m Not very skilled 
m Fairly skilled 
m Very skilled 
m Expert 
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In terms of your computer skills (e.g., securing your computer against viruses or safety 
threats), do you consider yourself to be... 
m Not at all skilled 
m Not very skilled 
m Fairly skilled 
m Very skilled 
m Expert 
 
Compared with the average person of your sex (male/female), how would you describe 
your physical size? 
m Much smaller than average 
m Smaller than average 
m A little smaller than average 
m About average 
m A little larger than average 
m Larger than average 
m Much larger than average 
 
What is your height? 
___ feet 
___ inches 
 
How much experience do you have with self-defense (e.g., taekwondo, karate, aikido)? 
m None at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
What is your sex? 
m Male 
m Female 
m Other: _______ 
 
What is your age?  
_______ 
 
Which best describes your race or ethnicity? 
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m White/Caucasian 
m Black/African-American 
m Hispanic/Latino 
m Native American 
m East Asian (e.g., China, Japan) 
m South Asian (e.g., India) 
m Southeast Asian (e.g., Indonesia) 
m Asian-American 
m Middle Eastern 
m Arab/Arab-American 
m Other: _______ 
 
In terms of income, how would you describe your family’s socio-economic status? 
m Upper class 
m Upper-middle class 
m Middle class 
m Lower-middle class 
m Working class 
m Other: _______ 
 
 
What is the 5-digit zip code of your permanent home? 
_______ 
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EXEMPTION GRANTED 
Sau Kwan 
Psychology 
- 
Virginia.Kwan@asu.edu 
Dear Sau Kwan: 
On 12/2/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
Type of Review: Initial Study 
Title: The relationship between perceived physical and 
online safety 
Investigator: Sau Kwan 
IRB ID: STUDY00005372 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Survey, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Protocol, Category: IRB Protocol; 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 12/2/2016.  
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
Sincerely, 
IRB Administrator 
cc: Jessica Bodford 
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We're interested in the impact of information processing on decision-making 
strategies. PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CAREFULLY. When 
you've finished reading, we will ask comprehension questions about the article. We will 
observe the amount of time you spend on the page. 
 
{CONDITION = PHYSICAL} 
 
Imagine that the following article describes events happening in your community. 
 
{Timing data: First Click, Last Click, Page Submit, Click Count} 
 
{CONDITION = ONLINE} 
 
Imagine that the following article describes events that actually happened. 
 
{Timing data: First Click, Last Click, Page Submit, Click Count} 
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{Physical, Self-Protection Threat} 
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{Physical, Resource Threat} 
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{Physical, Control} 
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{Online, Self-Protection Threat} 
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{Online, Resource Threat} 
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{Online, Control} 
 
 
 
{CONDITION = ALL} 
 
Which of the following best describes the article you just read? 
m A voyeur used infrared tracker goggles to spy on people in their homes 
m Burglars stole thousands of dollars worth of goods and car parts from parked cars 
m A new grocery store is opening in the neighborhood 
m A voyeur used malware to hack into people's webcams and spy on them 
m Hackers stole thousands of dollars from mobile payment app users 
m A new grocery shopping app is being released on the App Store and Google Play 
 
In the following questions, please indicate how you feel at this moment about your 
personal safety (i.e., in your day-to-day life). 
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How uncertain do you feel about your personal safety? 
m Not at all uncertain 
m A little uncertain 
m Moderately uncertain 
m Very uncertain 
m Extremely uncertain 
 
How much does your personal safety feel at risk? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much does your personal safety feel threatened? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you worry about your personal safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you think about your personal safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
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In the following questions, please indicate how you feel at this moment about your 
online safety (i.e., while using technology). 
 
How uncertain do you feel about your online safety? 
m Not at all uncertain 
m A little uncertain 
m Moderately uncertain 
m Very uncertain 
m Extremely uncertain 
 
How much does your online safety feel at risk? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much does your online safety feel threatened? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you worry about your online safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you think about your online safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
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In the following questions, please indicate how you feel at this moment about your 
financial safety (i.e., from someone stealing from you). 
 
How uncertain do you feel about your financial safety? 
m Not at all uncertain 
m A little uncertain 
m Moderately uncertain 
m Very uncertain 
m Extremely uncertain 
 
How much does your financial safety feel at risk? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much does your financial safety feel threatened? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you worry about your financial safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
How much do you think about your financial safety? 
m Not at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
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Tips to Stay Safe 
 
Please read the safety tips below and answer the questions that follow. 
 
{Timing data: First Click, Last Click, Page Submit, Click Count} 
 
{Each tip followed by the following item: 
How likely are you to follow this recommendation? 
m Extremely unlikely 
m Moderately unlikely 
m Slightly unlikely 
m Slightly likely 
m Moderately likely 
m Extremely likely} 
 
Guard basic personal information carefully 
When an unknown site or app requests a piece of information about you (e.g., camera 
access, zip code), think carefully before providing it. With just your date of birth, zip 
code, and gender, a hacker has a 63% likelihood of correctly identifying who you are and 
where you live (Golle, 2006). Steer clear of providing your birthday or year of birth in 
usernames. 
 
Use an app to share your whereabouts if you’re attacked 
The mobile app LiveSafe sends location-tagged text, calls, photos, and video clips if you 
are attacked. Users can set up scalable mass notifications, access safety resources, and 
ask peers to remotely keep an eye on them when walking alone. For more information, 
click here. 
 
Refrain from sharing your location 
Do not share geotagged posts of places you visit on a regular basis. Stalkers may use this 
information to predict your habits, which could leave you vulnerable to physical attack. 
Disable location-tracking services on apps that do not require this information (for 
instructions, click here. If you are away from home for an extended period of time, 
refrain from publicly sharing this information on social media; criminals may monitor 
public posts to better plan home break-ins. 
 
Would you like to see more tips? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Condition: No Is Selected. 
Skip To: End of Safety Tips (Response Efficacy, Self-Efficacy) 
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Pay attention to your surroundings 
If you are walking to your car alone, and particularly at night, keep an eye out for 
anything that looks suspicious. If you feel unsafe, throw off potential predators by 
walking in circles, talking to yourself, or entering your car through the passenger side 
door. If you are parked near a mall or shopping center, do not hesitate to ask for an escort 
from security personnel. If someone threatens you, throw your keys as far as possible and 
run in the opposite direction. For similar tips, click here. 
 
Turn on sign-in notifications 
Sign-in notifications alert you via e-mail or text when one of your accounts is accessed. If 
a hacker tries to log into to your account from another location, you can act more quickly 
to protect your account. Click here to activate these notifications for Gmail accounts, and 
here for Facebook accounts. 
 
Be prepared for home invasions 
Sleep with your car keys by your bed. In case of a home invasion, the Panic button 
should startle the attacker and alert neighbors that something is wrong. Consider keeping 
pepper spray close to your bed, just in case. For similar tips, click here. 
 
Would you like to see more tips? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Condition: No Is Selected. 
Skip To: End of Safety Tips (Response Efficacy, Self-Efficacy) 
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Be wary of e-mail attachments 
When you receive an e-mail, even from a friend, consider the possibility that it is 
infected. If anything seems suspicious about the message or attachment, check with the 
friend to make sure he or she actually sent it. Click here for more information about 
scanning attachments for viruses or malware. 
 
Always carry the essentials for self-protection 
Keep a cell phone battery charged and ready to use in case you find yourself stranded 
without a method of communication. In case your wallet is stolen, keep cash in another 
pocket or section of your bag. Consider carrying a whistle or pepper spray to ward off 
attackers and alert passersby that you need help. For a longer list of safety essentials, 
click here. 
 
Keep your content private 
Check all social media settings to ensure that only friends and family can view your 
content. By hiding your Friends list on Facebook (click here for instructions), you can 
better prevent impersonation attempts while also protecting the privacy of your social 
contacts. 
 
Walk with confidence 
Always look around you when walking, even during the day. Instead of looking at a cell 
phone or at the ground, carry yourself with a sense of confidence to discourage potential 
attackers. Make eye contact with people you pass, and especially if anyone seems to be 
following you; predators are wary of victims who might recognize them later. For more 
ways to appear confident when traveling alone, click here. 
 
Would you like to see more tips? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Condition: No Is Selected. 
Skip To: End of Safety Tips (Response Efficacy, Self-Efficacy) 
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Set a reminder to change your passwords at least every 6 months 
Periodically changing passwords helps prevent identity theft and sensitive data breaches. 
Use internal (e.g., Keychain Access for Mac users) or reputable third-party apps to store 
unique passwords, and refrain from using the same password across multiple accounts. 
Click here for a list of trusted (and free) password managers. 
 
Know the signs that an ATM that has been tampered with 
Use only ATMs located in well-lit, highly trafficked areas, and cover your fingers while 
entering PIN numbers and other sensitive information. Furthermore, learn the symptoms 
of an ATM that has been “skimmed” or tampered with, which allows thieves to store card 
data, zip codes, and PIN numbers for future use. Click here for these warning signs. 
 
Install an anti-virus program, and keep it updated 
Anti-virus software can protect against malicious programs or other attempts to 
compromise your computer. These programs can often detect far more than just viruses, 
including browser hijackers, spyware, online banking attacks, and phishing attempts. 
Click here for a list of the most highly rated anti-virus software packages. 
 
Look for the emergency exits 
Scan any public place (particularly crowded areas) for emergency exits. If anything 
happens, have an escape plan at the ready. If you enter an unfamiliar place with a group 
of people, establish a location where the group can meet again if anyone gets separated. 
 
Thinking of the safety tips you just read, please indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements. 
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These tips are effective in keeping me safe from harm.        
These tips work in preventing attack.        
If I follow these tips, I am less likely to be attacked.        
I am able to follow these tips to stay safe.        
I have the skills to follow these tips to stay safe.        
I have the time to follow these tips to stay safe.        
I can easily follow these tips to stay safe.        
 
Display This Question: 
  {Physical, Control} Is Not Displayed 
And 
  {Online, Control} Is Not Displayed	
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At the beginning of this study, you read an article that described a dangerous or alarming 
event. How often do you think an event like this occurs? 
m Never 
m Very rarely 
m Rarely 
m Occasionally 
m Often 
m Very often 
m All the time 
 
Keeping this particular event in mind, please indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with the following statements. 
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I believe that the threat described in this article is 
severe. 
       
I believe that the threat described in this article has 
serious negative consequences. 
       
I believe that the threat described in this article is 
extremely harmful. 
       
If you are reading this, select Somewhat Agree        
It is likely that I will face this threat in my lifetime.        
I am at risk for a threat like this.        
It is possible that I will experience this threat one day.        
 
Have you or a household member ever been a victim of theft or burglary (either when 
you were at home or away from home)? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Have you or a household member ever been the victim of assault/battery, robbery, or 
murder? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Have you or a household member ever been the victim of identity theft? 
m No 
m Yes 
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Have you or a household member ever been the victim of cyberbullying or 
cyberstalking? 
m No 
m Yes 
 
Compared with the average person of your sex (male/female), how would you describe 
your physical size? (This may refer to body frame, height, etc.) 
m Much smaller than average 
m Smaller than average 
m A little smaller than average 
m About average 
m A little larger than average 
m Larger than average 
m Much larger than average 
 
What is your height? 
___ feet 
___ inches 
 
How much experience do you have with self-defense (e.g., taekwondo, karate, aikido)? 
m None at all 
m A little 
m A moderate amount 
m A lot 
m A great deal 
 
In terms of your Internet skills (i.e., changing privacy or security settings in your 
browser), do you consider yourself to be... 
m Not at all skilled 
m Not very skilled 
m Fairly skilled 
m Very skilled 
m Expert 
 
In terms of your computer skills (i.e., securing your computer against viruses or safety 
threats), do you consider yourself to be... 
m Not at all skilled 
m Not very skilled 
m Fairly skilled 
m Very skilled 
m Expert 
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What is your sex? 
m Male 
m Female 
 
What age group do you belong to? 
m Under 18 
m 18 - 24 
m 25 - 34 
m 35 - 44 
m 45 - 54 
m 55 - 64 
m 65 - 74 
m 75 - 84 
m 85 or older 
 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
m White 
m Black or African American 
m Latino/a 
m American Indian or Alaska Native 
m Asian 
m Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
m Two or more ethnicities 
m Other 
 
Which of the following best describes your annual household income? 
m Less than $10,000 
m $10,000 - $19,999 
m $20,000 - $29,999 
m $30,000 - $39,999 
m $40,000 - $49,999 
m $50,000 - $59,999 
m $60,000 - $69,999 
m $70,000 - $79,999 
m $80,000 - $89,999 
m $90,000 - $99,999 
m $100,000 - $149,999 
m More than $150,000 
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What is the highest level of education you've attained? 
m Less than high school 
m High school graduate 
m Some college 
m 2-year degree 
m 4-year degree 
m Professional degree 
m Doctorate 
 
What is the 5-digit zip code of your permanent home? 
_______ 
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EXEMPTION GRANTED
Sau Kwan
Psychology
-
Virginia.Kwan@asu.edu
Dear Sau Kwan:
On 3/2/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:
Type of Review: Initial Study
Title: The Relationship between Physical and Online Safety
Investigator: Sau Kwan
IRB ID: STUDY00005848
Funding: None
Grant Title: None
Grant ID: None
Documents Reviewed: • Recruiting, Category: Recruitment Materials;
• Qualtrics Survey, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions);
• Consent, Category: Consent Form;
• Protocol, Category: IRB Protocol;
• Debriefing, Category: Other (to reflect anything not 
captured above);
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 3/2/2017. 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
Sincerely,
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Table 12 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, physical self-protection threat 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 2.43 0.95 105 
Perceived online threat 2.76 0.90 105 
Perceived financial threat 2.72 1.06 105 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 5.01 0.87 105 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.44 1.55 105 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.60 0.99 105 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.46 0.85 104 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 4.88 0.73 104 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.51 0.67 103 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.31 0.56 104 
Situation-specific Perceived threat severity 4.45 1.03 104 
Perceived threat probability 3.71 1.30 104 
Person-specific Perceived threat susceptibility 3.07 1.09 104 
Physical size 3.95 1.29 104 
Height (inches) 67.11 4.17 104 
Self-defense expertise 1.88 1.02 104 
Security-related digital literacy 3.37 0.75 104 
 
 
Table 13 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, physical resource threat 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 2.30 0.92 115 
Perceived online threat 2.59 0.91 115 
Perceived financial threat 2.70 1.11 115 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 5.10 0.94 115 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.82 1.58 115 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.62 1.01 115 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.49 0.90 115 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 4.98 0.80 115 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.71 0.75 115 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.43 0.64 115 
Situation-specific Perceived threat severity 4.41 0.85 114 
Perceived threat probability 4.79 1.35 115 
Person-specific Perceived threat susceptibility 4.13 1.02 114 
Physical size 4.20 1.33 115 
Height (inches) 67.63 3.81 115 
Self-defense expertise 1.71 0.90 115 
Security-related digital literacy 3.27 0.85 115 
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Table 14 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, physical control 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 1.86 0.68 103 
Perceived online threat 2.44 0.88 103 
Perceived financial threat 2.68 1.12 103 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 4.85 1.20 103 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.85 1.60 103 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.45 0.87 103 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.46 0.93 103 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 4.92 0.75 103 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.45 0.70 103 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.33 0.55 103 
Person-specific Physical size 4.25 1.37 102 
Height (inches) 67.08 3.92 102 
Self-defense expertise 1.81 0.94 102 
Security-related digital literacy 3.26 0.73 102 
 
 
Table 15 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, online self-protection threat 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 2.36 1.03 112 
Perceived online threat 2.80 0.96 112 
Perceived financial threat 2.80 1.09 112 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 5.05 0.94 112 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.82 1.65 112 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.69 1.12 112 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.59 0.96 112 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 4.99 0.76 112 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.66 0.74 112 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.40 0.58 112 
Situation-specific Perceived threat severity 4.77 0.96 112 
Perceived threat probability 4.42 1.30 112 
Person-specific Perceived threat susceptibility 3.41 1.10 112 
Physical size 4.14 1.13 111 
Height (inches) 66.94 3.96 111 
Self-defense expertise 1.85 1.01 111 
Security-related digital literacy 3.23 0.68 111 
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Table 16 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, online resource threat 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 2.30 1.02 108 
Perceived online threat 2.89 0.84 108 
Perceived financial threat 2.78 1.13 107 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 4.98 1.03 107 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.80 1.63 107 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.49 0.87 107 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.77 1.00 105 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 5.01 0.72 105 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.60 0.74 105 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.35 0.60 105 
Situation-specific Perceived threat severity 5.08 0.77 105 
Perceived threat probability 5.01 1.07 104 
Person-specific Perceived threat susceptibility 4.22 0.85 105 
Physical size 4.16 1.37 105 
Height (inches) 67.16 4.06 103 
Self-defense expertise 1.95 1.05 105 
Security-related digital literacy 3.23 0.75 105 
 
 
Table 17 
Study 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables, online control 
Variable Type Variable Mean SD N 
Perceived threat Perceived physical threat 2.06 0.79 113 
Perceived online threat 2.56 0.72 113 
Perceived financial threat 2.75 1.09 112 
Safety practice 
intentionality 
Safety practice intentionality: Online 4.99 1.01 112 
Safety practice intentionality: Physical 3.48 1.60 111 
Safety practices pages viewed 1.36 0.79 112 
Response efficacy (safety practices) 4.60 0.80 111 
Self-efficacy (safety practices) 4.98 0.79 111 
Victimization Victim: Physical crime 0.59 0.76 111 
Victim: Cybercrime 0.34 0.56 111 
Person-specific Physical size 4.41 1.28 111 
Height (inches) 67.17 4.29 110 
Self-defense expertise 1.74 0.91 111 
Security-related digital literacy 3.17 0.75 111 
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Table 21 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, physical self-protection threat 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .551*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .580*** .605*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent .114 .244** .192* — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .298** .300** .326*** .288** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .167† .213* .183† .146 .452*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .050 .188† .072 .259** .450*** .193* — 
8. Self-efficacy .065 .139 .094 .370*** .389*** .270** .653*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 104 ≤ n ≤ 105 
 
 
Table 22 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, physical self-protection threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .092 — — — — — — — 
11. Severity .116 -.057 — — — — — — 
12. Probability .191† .097 .324*** — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility .087 .097 .305*** .583*** — — — — 
14. Physical size .121 .075 .141 .178† .009 — — — 
15. Height .076 .082 -.042 -.036 -.127 .529*** — — 
16. Self-defense .038 .051 -.106 .097 .069 .158 .261** — 
17. Digital literacy .038 .054 -.083 .055 -.004 .084 .154 .168† 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 103 ≤ n ≤ 104 
 
 
Table 23 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, physical self-protection 
threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .177† .041 .181† .386*** .423*** -.122 -.248** .144 -.025 
2. .038 .157 .330*** .336*** .292** -.023 -.016 .087 -.051 
3. .138 .180† .185† .345*** .415*** .002 -.117 .076 .011 
4. .004 .099 .277** .199* .161 .091 .093 -.035 .109 
5. .025 .030 .239** .376*** .415*** -.132 -.237* .154 .014 
6. .158 .081 .144 .206* .173† -.061 -.009 .258** .052 
7.  -.074 -.135 .369*** .127 .139 .059 -.024 .052 .016 
8. -.014 -.071 .298** .209* .157 .033 -.012 -.069 .263** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 103 ≤ n ≤ 104 
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Table 24 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, physical resource threat 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .345*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .281** .322*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent .034 .167† .178† — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .348*** .287** -.042 .323*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .149 .157† .040 .144 .418*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .074 .112 -.109 .162† .326*** .182* — 
8. Self-efficacy .087 .073 -.052 .363*** .304*** .207* .525*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 115 
 
 
Table 25 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, physical resource threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .334*** — — — — — — — 
11. Severity -.011 -.020 — — — — — — 
12. Probability .193* .156† .145 — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility .238** .094 .038 .586*** — — — — 
14. Physical size .041 -.008 .080 .176† .110 — — — 
15. Height .015 -.105 -.213* -.075 -.018 .519*** — — 
16. Self-defense .059 .232** -.039 .226* .082 .174† .252** — 
17. Digital literacy .080 -.033 -.211* .076 .199* .152 .218* .246** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 114 ≤ n ≤ 115 
 
 
Table 26 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, physical resource threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .077 .052 .261** .250** .334*** .187* -.066 .143 .080 
2. .085 .067 .099 .173† .182* .187* -.084 .172† -.170† 
3. .176† .195* .116 .237** .257** .093 -.061 .051 .058 
4. -.074 -.026 .144 .151 .072 .110 -.157† -.015 .012 
5. -.124 -.001 .157† .273** .274** .149 -.147 .238** .045 
6. -.007 .105 .042 .198* .200* .051 -.048 .091 -.008 
7.  -.001 .145 .183* .318*** .225* .054 -.135 .050 .013 
8. .153 .080 .171† .290** .173† .180* -.024 .091 .215* 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 114 ≤ n ≤ 115 
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Table 27 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, physical control 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .568*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .519*** .470*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent -.038 .156 -.033 — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .139 .292** .103 .390*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .087 .132 .117 .191* .316*** — — 
7. Response efficacy -.050 .068 -.061 .439*** .360*** .221* — 
8. Self-efficacy -.066 -.018 .097 .465*** .321*** .186† .612*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 103 
 
 
Table 28 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, physical control 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .123 — — — — — — — 
11. Severity — — — — — — — — 
12. Probability — — — — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility — — — — — — — — 
14. Physical size .200* -.061 — — — — — — 
15. Height .041 -.081 — — — .548*** — — 
16. Self-defense .099 .140 — — — .076 .203* — 
17. Digital literacy -.042 .124 — — — .091 .109 .109 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 102 
 
 
Table 29 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, physical control 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .162 .001 — — — -.024 -.083 .055 -.152 
2. .222* .049 — — — .201* .004 -.028 -.133 
3. .219* .220* — — — .076 -.164† -.043 -.003 
4. -.029 -.031 — — — .074 -.124 -.181† .023 
5. .041 .063 — — — .145 -.097 .033 -.151 
6. .298** .017 — — — .095 -.030 .197* .064 
7.  -.022 .007 — — — .013 -.057 -.033 -.019 
8. .051 .138 — — — -.010 -.193* .011 -.035 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 102 ≤ n ≤ 103 
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Table 30 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, online self-protection threat 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .719*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .506*** .587*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent .253** .362*** .314*** — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .354*** .266** .436*** .383*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .191* .156† .120 .144 .392*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .259** .201* .195* .522*** .459*** .216* — 
8. Self-efficacy .221* .225* .136 .593*** .354*** .147 .697*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; n = 112 
 
 
Table 31 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, online self-protection threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .237** — — — — — — — 
11. Severity -.057 .029 — — — — — — 
12. Probability .205* .170† .246** — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility .013 .212* .212* .458*** — — — — 
14. Physical size .097 -.001 -.022 .072 .112 — — — 
15. Height -.032 .075 -.081 -.012 .029 .540*** — — 
16. Self-defense .065 .247** -.024 .139 .114 .169† .157† — 
17. Digital literacy -.093 .032 -.220* -.078 -.209* .326*** .311*** .295** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 111 ≤ n ≤ 112 
 
 
Table 32 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, online self-protection threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .016 .103 .130 .298*** .341*** -.075 -.096 .087 -.143 
2. .003 .133 .277** .291** .521*** -.065 .042 .214* -.184* 
3. -.035 -.018 .214* .203* .363*** -.131 .021 .220* .034 
4. .062 .059 .364*** .112 .124 -.098 -.051 .058 -.137 
5. .003 .118 .140 .142 .137 -.169† -.173† .099 -.110 
6. .066 .070 .074 .115 .065 .026 -.068 .126 -.093 
7.  -.032 .082 .242** -.054 .111 -.076 -.116 .077 -.084 
8. .001 .046 .393*** .092 .080 -.082 -.162† .011 -.118 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 111 ≤ n ≤ 112 
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Table 33 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, online resource threat 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .517*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .603*** .601*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent .051 .130 -.042 — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .177† .188* .062 .405*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed .100 .119 .019 .198* .367*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .057 .078 -.099 .529*** .353*** .168† — 
8. Self-efficacy -.013 -.037 -.085 .414*** .285** .171† .710*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 105 ≤ n ≤ 108 
 
 
Table 34 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, online resource threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .210* — — — — — — — 
11. Severity -.043 .068 — — — — — — 
12. Probability -.057 -.096 .144 — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility .059 .035 .236* .341*** — — — — 
14. Physical size -.106 -.023 -.021 .118 .021 — — — 
15. Height .022 -.030 -.038 -.130 -.061 .437*** — — 
16. Self-defense .123 .284** .038 .104 -.060 .072 .098 — 
17. Digital literacy .100 .018 .076 .052 .057 .094 .141 .397*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 102 ≤ n ≤ 105 
 
 
Table 35 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, online resource threat 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. -.052 -.004 -.045 .186† .190* .165† -.045 .011 -.048 
2. -.037 .128 .131 .234* .147 .044 -.093 .080 -.011 
3. .073 -.031 .008 .164† .199* .136 .066 .070 .112 
4. -.035 -.135 .311*** .052 -.119 -.145 -.180† -.093 .041 
5. .085 .087 .157 .162† -.055 -.067 -.080 .325*** .223* 
6. .227* .109 -.047 -.057 -.122 -.026 -.115 .119 -.028 
7.  -.025 -.009 .267** .126 .023 -.202* -.236* .060 -.024 
8. -.029 -.041 .308*** .088 -.024 -.189* -.302** .225* .122 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 103 ≤ n ≤ 105 
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Table 36 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent variables, online control 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Physical threat — — — — — — — 
2. Online threat .458*** — — — — — — 
3. Financial threat .313*** .327*** — — — — — 
4. Online tip intent -.056 .033 -.053 — — — — 
5. Physical tip intent .139 .077 .026 .362*** — — — 
6. Tip pages viewed -.087 .034 .103 .084 .310*** — — 
7. Response efficacy .054 -.074 -.122 .256** .402*** .136 — 
8. Self-efficacy -.217* -.283** -.118 .357*** .255** .011 .633*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 111 ≤ n ≤ 113 
 
 
Table 37 
Study 4: Correlations of exploratory factors, online control 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. Victim: phys — — — — — — — — 
10. Victim: online .314*** — — — — — — — 
11. Severity — — — — — — — — 
12. Probability — — — — — — — — 
13. Susceptibility — — — — — — — — 
14. Physical size .100 .007 — — — — — — 
15. Height -.110 -.100 — — — .471*** — — 
16. Self-defense -.040 -.072 — — — -.010 .234* — 
17. Digital literacy .006 .011 — — — -.153 -.078 .193* 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 110 ≤ n ≤ 111 
 
 
Table 38 
Study 4: Correlations of dependent and exploratory factors, online control 
 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. .147 .125 — — — -.077 -.092 .035 -.046 
2. -.034 .085 — — — -.006 .179† .164† -.245** 
3. .133 .103 — — — .042 .004 -.141 -.008 
4. -.073 -.060 — — — -.130 -.243** -.062 .089 
5. .015 .068 — — — -.085 -.194* .030 .070 
6. .175† -.075 — — — -.047 .014 .194* .147 
7.  -.039 -.120 — — — -.102 -.139 -.064 .023 
8. .017 -.118 — — — -.117 -.204* -.113 .192* 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 110 ≤ n ≤ 111 
 
